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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was 
determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current 
Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis 
would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the 
implementation of the requirements identified in the StandardsIRequirements Identification 
Document. The StandardsIRequirements Identification Documents commit a facility to 
compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, 
provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. 
This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the 
current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide 
the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform 
functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique 
to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a 
grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 
5480.19) and the SuspectICounterfeit Items Program. 
In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes 
developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization 
facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design 
and operation of the YMP site characterization activities. 
1.1 ACTIVITY EVALUATION 
An activity evaluation was performed on the Integrated Safety Management System work scope 
to determine if this work is quality affecting. This activity evaluation (Gwyn 1999a) concluded 
that this activity is not quality affecting and is not subject to the requirements of Quality 
Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2000). As such, this report is classified as QA: 
NA. 
1.2 OVERVIEW 
Section 2 of this report identifies and describes the major systems of the YMP, including the 
Exploratory Studies Facilities (ESF), as well as the other Area 25 and off-site support facilities. 
This compilation will serve as the basis for the configuration of the YMP facilities and will be 
used for the Functional Classification activities described in Section 5. Some of the off-site 
support facilities utilize buildings that are privately owned, DOE or contractor leased facilities, 
which fall under the authority and permit of local governing agencies other than the DOE. It is 
the responsibility of the building owners to meet all local, state, and federal building codes and 
standards and the local authority to enforce those standards. When these buildings are used by 
the DOE or their contractors for the permitted purpose, these facilities will not be required to be 
functionally classified by this Safety Basis. 
Section 3.0 develops the Facility Hazard Classification for all YMP facilities that support site 
characterization activities.. Using methodology established by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), the types of quantities of hazardous materials present at the Area 25 facilities were 1 
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compared to applicable standards provided in various Codes of Federal Regulations. It was I 
concluded that the YMP facilities that support the YMP site characterization activities are 
classified as Industrial Facilities. The hazardous materials assessed included hazardous 
chemicals and radioactive material in the form of sources used solely for calibration and testing 
radiation detectors and radiography. 
Section 4 provides an overview of how the evaluation of hazards and the incorporation of safety 
considerations are an integral part of the design process. The alternate construction approach 
that was employed to expedite the completion of the ESF main drift tunnel is also described. 
Title I11 Evaluation Reports were developed to evaluate the appropriateness of further ESF 
modifications necessary to complete the ESF construction. 
Functional Classification is the process for identifying functions (and the SSCs or Administrative 
Controls (ACs) that perform those functions) that reduce the risk to the public and workers from 
hazardous materials. Functional Classification is a graded classification system used to 
determine the minimum requirements for SSCs (i.e., requirements for design, operation, 
procurement, and maintenance). Four Functional Classification Levels (FCLs) and their 
corresponding criteria were developed and documented in Section 5. These classifications 
provide a clear distinction between the ESF systems that support the mitigation of hazards that 
are unique to the YMP site characterization activities and those YMP systems that mitigate 
hazards that are common to the tunneling industry. This distinction is important because the 
hazards that are common to the tunneling industry (for Area 25 activities) are well known and 
have been characterized. National consensus standards and codes have been established to 
address the mitigation of these common hazards. The hazards that are unique to the YMP site 
characterization activities have to be specifically addressed and analyzed as there are no 
available codes and standards to address these unique hazards. The Functional Classification of 
the 29 ESF systems described in Section 2 resulted in all systems being classified as FCL3 or I 
FCL4 (important to sustaining production but not involved with mitigating a unique YMP site 
characterization hazard). 
The management and control of changes to this report is provided for and described in Section 6. 
The Management of Safety Basis Change Process procedure (AP-ENG-001) was produced to 
provide the appropriate guidance and controls for managing changes to the safety basis for the 
YMP site characterization activities. 
1.3 SUMMARY 
The hazard baseline and the Functional Classification of the systems that comprise the YMP 
have been established and documented in this report. The hazard baseline analysis resulted in 
the classification of the YMP site characterization facilities as an Industrial Facility. The 
Functional Classification documented the functions of the systems that comprise the YMP to I 
reduce the risk to the public and workers from YMP activities and hazardous materials. All 
YMP systems were classified as FCL3 or FCL4. 
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2. YMP FACILITIES 
The facilities that support current YMP activities include numerous test areas and facilities in 
Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as well as office buildings, a warehouse, science centers, 
and laboratory test facilities in Las Vegas and other locations, both in-state and out-of-state. 
This section provides a brief description of these YMP facilities for the purpose of describing the 
roles of these facilities and the hazards associated with them to establish a comprehensive safety 
basis. The ESF has been organized into systems that are consistent with the Exploratory Studies 
Facility Design Requirements (ESFDR) (YMP 1997). The FCLs of the YMP systems are 
established in Section 5. 
2.1 ESFSYSTEMS 
2.1.1 ESF Subsurface Ventilation System 
The Subsurface Ventilation System provides fresh air to the ESF subsurface using three main 
ventilation systems consisting of fans and ductwork. The Topopah Spring (TS) Loop is 
ventilated using a flow-through system in which air is drawn through the tunnel from the North 
to the South Portal using fans and a ventilation bulkhead located near the South Portal. The 
Cross Drift is ventilated using an exhaust system that removes the air from the terminal end of 
the Cross Drift and exhausts it at the North Portal. The ESF alcoves are ventilated either by 
reusing the air from the bored tunnel (TS Loop or Cross Drift) or by means of an exhaust system 
that transports the air to the North Portal. Standby power is provided to the flow-through system 
by the generator located on the South Portal Pad. 
2.1.2 ESP Conveyor System 
The Conveyor System provides a means of transporting muck from the subsurface using a rubber 
belt conveyor controlled through the Programmable Logic Controller system. The 36-inch wide 
TS Loop section consists of the Radial Stacker, Transfer Tower No. 1, belt take-up and storage 
unit, booster and return booster drives, conveyor supports and accessories, automatic water 
sprays, and a tail pulley that is moved to suit the needs of construction. The similar 24-inch wide 
Cross Drift section connects with the TS Loop section at the Cross Drift Conveyor Transfer 
Point. 
2.1.3 ESF Power System 
ESF Surface Power System-The Surface Power System extends from 8 feet north of the 25-16 
Substation Fence to the Subsurface Power Center and includes: 
Pad mounted distribution transformers 
Medium voltage (12,470 and 4,160 volts) distribution systems 
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Distribution to permanent facilities, an air compressor system, and the buried 
distribution system 
Lightning protection and grounding 
The Surface Power System also distributes power to the DOE-owned structures that were 
originally supplied and constructed by the previous tunneling contractor as "constructor- 
furnished temporary facilities." 
ESF Subsurface Power System-The Subsurface Power System includes the Subsurface Power 
Center, North Portal and south standby generator systems, flow-through ventilation system, 
Alcove #5 power distribution system, and the Cross Drift power distribution system. The 
Subsurface Power System also includes the constructor-furnished power distribution systems 
including the 12,470 medium volt distribution system, low voltage (480 and 1201208 volts) 
distribution systems, mine power centers and equipment, and subsurface grounding. 
2.1.4 ESF Compressed Air System 
The Compressed Air System provides a means of supplying pressurized air to the surface and 
subsurface for use in construction operations. The system consists of two air compressors (one 
primary and one backup) located on the North Portal Pad and piping and accessories that traverse 
both the TS Loop and the Cross Drift. 
2.1.5 ESF Waste Water System 
The Waste Water System provides a means of transporting water used in mining or drilling 
operations in the TS Loop and Cross Drift to surface storage tanks. The system consists of three 
surface tanks (two settling and one storage) located on the North Portal Pad, piping and 
accessories that traverse the TS Loop and the Cross Drift, sumps, pumps, and a settling tank 
located at the Cross Drift starter tunnel. Stored water is used for dust control on the North Portal 
Pad. 
2.1.6 ESF Material and Personnel Handling System 
The Material and Personnel Handling System provides a means to transport people, equipment, 
materials, or muck to and from the subsurface areas to meet the needs of construction and 
testing. The system includes rail cars, locomotives, rail and accessories, and the concrete invert 
segments. The TS Loop rail system consists of rebar ties placed in the concrete invert segment 
blockouts and attached to rails set at 36-inch gage. The Cross Drift rail system consists of 
36-inch gage rail attached to wood ties that have been coated with fire retardant paint. 
2.1.7 ESF Communication System 
The Communication System provides a means of linking the surface and subsurface areas, 
facilities, and outside commercial communication systems. The surface system consists of a 
telephone link through the microwave system, a radio link with NTS, fiber optic lines for 
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computer use, and a link to the subsurface mine phones. The TS Loop and Cross Drift use 
Femco mine phones as the primary means of communication. 
2.1.8 ESF Potable Water System 
The Potable Water System provides chlorinated water to the North Portal Pad. The system 
consists of a 50,000-gallon tank, a chlorination shed, and piping and accessories. Water is 
pumped from the Booster Pump Station into the tank, is chlorinated, and then gravity fed through 
the buried North Portal Pad piping. 
2.1.9 ESF Non-Potable Water System 
ESF Surface Non-Potable Water System-The Surface Non-Potable Water System provides 
water to the North Portal Pad for use in construction operations and fire protection. The system 
consists of a 200,000-gallon tank, piping and accessories, and fire hydrants. Water is pumped 
from well 5-13 through the Booster Pump Station into the tank, and is then gravity fed through 
the buried North Portal Pad piping. 
ESF Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water 
SystemThe Subsurface Fire Water System and subsurface portion of the Non-Potable Water 
System transfers water from the Surface Non-Potable Water System to the subsurface for use in 
construction operations and fire suppression. The system consists of three tanks and transfer 
pumps located on the North Portal Pad, piping and accessories that traverse the TS Loop and 
Cross Drift, fire hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers. Water is manually mixed with a 
lithium bromide tracer in the holding tanks prior to being introduced to the subsurface areas. In 
the event of a large fire that requires the volume of all three tanks, additional fire water could be 
drawn from the Surface Non-Potable Water System; however, there would not be sufficient time 
to add lithium bromide tracer prior to adding the water to the system. This is unlikely because 
the Subsurface Fire Water System is only used as backup means of fighting incipient fires. 
2.1.10 ESF Muck Storage System 
The Muck Storage System provides an area for the storage of excavated rock from subsurface 
construction. The storage pile is located east of the North Portal Pad and west of the North 
Portal Pad road. Muck that is piled from the end of the Radial Stacker is transferred to the 
storage pile using mechanical equipment. 
2.1.11 ESF Ground Support System 
The Ground Support System provides a means of structural support or reinforcement to the rock 
of excavated openings and protection to personnel and equipment against falls of ground within 
the excavated openings. The system consists of various types of rock bolts used in conjunction 
with welded wire fabric, mine mats, and shotcrete, and steel sets used in conjunction with 
lagging and cribbing. 
ESF Q Ground Support-Q ground support includes the ground support installed in the North 
Ramp Starter Tunnel, Alcove #1, TS Loop, Cross Drift Starter Tunnel and transition zone, TS 
Loop alcove and niche transition zones, and the South Portal headwall. 
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ESF Non-Q Ground Support-Non-Q ground support includes the ground support installed 
from the end of the transition zone to the face of the terminal end of TS Loop alcoves and niches 
and the Cross Drift, Cross Drift alcoves and niches, the North Portal head wall and sidewalls, 
and the South Portal side walls. 
2.1.12 ESF Sanitation System 
The Sanitation System provides a means of collecting and transporting sanitary waste from the 
North Portal Pad facilities to the treatment system, and from the subsurface to the surface. 
ESF Surface Sanitation System-The Surface Sanitation System consists of a buried collection 
system consisting of piping and manholes and a buried treatment system consisting of a septic 
tank, dosing tank, distribution boxes, and a leach field. 
ESF Subsurface Sanitation System-The Subsurface Sanitation System consists of portable 
toilets located throughout the TS Loop and Cross Drift. The portable toilets are maintained by 
utilizing the Sanitation Car, which is then emptied periodically by the NTS contractor. 
2.1.13 ESF Subsurface Lighting System 
The Subsurface Lighting System provides illumination to subsurface areas including the TS 
Loop and the Cross Drift, alcoves, niches, and portal entrances. The system consists of light 
fixtures, wiring, portable light fixtures, and exit and emergency lighting. 
2.1.14 ESF Access Road System 
The Access Road System provides a link connecting the North Portal Pad to auxiliary sites and 
to the NTS road system. The system includes the North and South Portal access roads and the 
Muck Storage, Topsoil and Rock Storage, and Water Storage access roads. 
2.1.15 ESF North Portal Pad Drainage System 
The North Portal Pad Drainage System provides a means to divert and transport storm water 
runoff on the North Portal Pad. The system consists of an interceptor channel, a drainage 
interceptor ditch, road drainage ditches, and culverts that discharge to retrieval channels. 
2.1.16 ESF South Portal Pad Drainage 
The South Portal Pad slopes away from the portal, thereby prohibiting storm water runoff from 
entering the tunnel. 
2.1.17 ESF Change House 
The Change House is a permanent building located on the North Portal Pad that provides a 
structure that houses shower and locker facilities for personnel, medical and training facilities, 
and mine rescue facilities. The ESF Change House is also used by Busted Butte personnel at the 
beginning and end of shift for more significant change house functions other than the simple 
change house functions conducted at trailers at the Busted Butte site. 
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2.1.18 ESF Switchgear Building 
The Switchgear Building is a permanent building located on the North Portal Pad that provides 
an enclosure for electrical switchgear equipment and ice-making equipment. 
2.1.19 ESF Security System 
The Security System provides protection to the ESF facilities and controls access to the North 
and South Portals. The system consists of barbed wire fencing around the perimeter of the North 
Portal Pad, and chain link fencing and gates located at the North and South Portals, the main 
entrances to the North and South Portal Pads, and the entry to the Muck Storage area. 
Underground access to both the North and South Portals is controlled by trained personnel at the 
Access Control Station located near the North Portal. 
2.1.20 ESF Topsoil/Rock Storage 
The TopsoiVRock Storage Area is located in Area 25 of the NTS, midway between the North 
and South Portal Pads. Topsoil removed during the construction of the ESF North Portal Pad is 
stored in this area. The stored soil is contoured to prevent erosion and excess runoff, and 
stabilized by the presence of plants and grasses introduced by the Environmental Sciences 
Section. No structures, services, or utilities are present. 
2.1.21 ESF Explosive Storage 
Explosive Storage for the ESF provides a locked facility for explosives used in tunneling 
operations. The system consists of two International Society of Mechanical Engineers Type I1 
magazines, one for powder and one for blasting caps, located in Split Wash. Explosives are 
transported underground utilizing a special-use Explosive Car. 
2.1.22 ESF Data Acquisition 
Data Acquisition provides a means for the Test Coordination Office to collect data from testing 
equipment throughout the ESF underground, including the Data Collection System for the Drift 
Scale Test. Data is collected both manually and using a real-time data collection network via 
fiber optic lines. Standby power is provided to the Data Collection System by the generator 
located on the North Portal Pad. 
2.1.23 ESF Parking Areas 
Parking Areas provide spaces and allowances for vehicle parking necessary to support operations 
and testing. 
2.1.24 ESF Warehouse 
The Warehouse provides enclosures for the storage of construction materials. The two DOE- 
owned, fabric type, pre-engineered structures are located on the North Portal Pad and were 
originally supplied and constructed by the previous tunneling contractor as "constructor 
furnished temporary facilities." 
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2.1.25 ESF Shop Building 
The Shop Building provides a series of structures for the maintenance and repair of equipment 
used in construction and operations. The DOE-owned Conex complex is located on the North 
Portal Pad and was originally supplied and constructed by the previous tunneling contractor as 
"constructor furnished temporary facilities." 
2.1.26 ESF Operations Building 
The Operations Building provides office structures that support ESF personnel. The DOE- 
owned temporary trailers are located on the North Portal Pad and were originally supplied and 
constructed by the previous tunneling contractor as "constructor furnished temporary facilities." 
2.1.27 ESF Visitor Center 
The ESF Visitor Center provides information and staging areas for public tours to the ESF. 
Current visitor presentations are conducted in the Change House and in Alcove #2. 
2.1.28 ESF ECRB Refuge Chambers 
Refige chambers are located in the ECRB to provide a method of refuge for employees or 
visitors who cannot reach the surface using the normal exit method in the event of a hazard such 
as a fire. Two refuge chambers are located in the ECRB cross drift: one at Alcove 8; the other 
behind the bulkhead at Station 17+63 at the page phone at Station 18+43 (BSC 2001a). Both 
refuge chambers are constructed so that they can be made gas-tight, have compressed air lines, 
water lines, and mine phones behind their respective bulkheads, and have firestopping material 
applied to their respective bulkheads. Each refuge chamber contains bottled water, gas detectors, 
and other assorted tools and miscellaneous equipment (e.g., blankets, toilets, flashlights). 
Materials and equipment are also provided for sealing the chambers, included duct tape, buckets, 
quick setting cementitous compound, and ladders. The refuge chamber behind the bulkhead at 
Station 17+63 at the page phone at Station 18+43 is supplied with half-face respirators. The 
refbge chamber at Alcove 8 is equipped with supplied-air fbll face respirators and demand 
regulators attached to compressed air bottles as well as self-contained self-rescuers (BSC 2001b). 
The maximum number of miners, visitors, and support personnel in the ECRB is limited to 30 
due to the fact that there are 30 bottles of compressed air stored in the refuge chamber at Alcove 
8 (BSC 2001~). However, based on the space requirements in the refuge chamber at Alcove 8, a 
maximum of 53 individuals may be allowed in the ECRB if the number of air bottles in the 
refuge chamber is increased to 53 (BSC 2001b). 
2.1.29 ESF Systems Not Addressed 
The following systems discussed in the ESFDR (YMP 1997) are not addressed since they are not 
present in the current ESF configuration: Covered Storage, Guard House, Surface Conveyor 
System, Load Management System, Facility Monitoring and Control System, and Subsurface 
Monitoring and Warning System. 
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2.2 BUSTED BUTTE FACILITIES 
The Busted Butte Test Facility was constructed to conduct the Unsaturated Zone (UZ) Transport 
Test, which is part of the overall program of site characterization at Yucca Mountain. The 
facility is located at Busted Butte in Area 25 of the NTS, approximately 5 miles southeast of the 
ESF. The facility is comprised of a dirt road from Stagecoach Road, a rock highwall and pad, 
and an underground testing facility consisting of a nominally 60-m adit and 15-m test alcove. 
The facility was built to conduct transport testing in the Calico Hills rock section that outcrops at 
Busted Butte. 
Test management, coordination, and implementation is conducted using Field Work Package 
FWP-ESF-96-002 (CRWMS M&O 1999), which was written, approved, and revised according 
to AP-5.2Q, Testing Work Packages. Hazard identification and mitigation for the test operations 
within this facility are conducted in accordance with AP-ESH-008, Hazard Analysis System, or 
equivalent process in place when FWP-ESF-96-002 was last revised. 
The Busted Butte Test Facility, as currently constructed, is comprised of the systems described in 
the following subsections. The FCLs of these systems are established in Section 5.3. 
2.2.1 Busted Butte Subsurface Ventilation System 
The Busted Butte Subsurface Ventilation System provides fresh air to the subsurface using a 
single ventilation system, consisting of a 30 hp exhaust fan and 36-inch diameter ventline 
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system, capable of generating 35,000 cfm. Ventilation is established by using a pull system in 
which outside air is pulled through the portal to the end of the ducts located near the end of the 
main adit, and a split located in the test alcove. The air is exhausted through a duct running up 
from the portal to an area above the highwall. Ventilation is supplied underground only when 
personnel are working underground to minimize drying out of the test bed. All power is supplied 
by one of two generators located on the Busted Butte Pad. 
2.2.2 Busted Butte Power System 
All power at Busted Butte is supplied by one of two diesel generators located on the Busted 
Butte Pad. Each generator generates about 125 kW. Power is necessary 24 hours per day, 7 
days per week for scientific activities. Standby power is provided to the facility by a backup 
generator. The generators are wired to provide 480 volts. The surface power requirements 
include low voltage (1201208 volts) distribution systems mainly to power two surface trailers, 
one for the constructor and one for scientific activities. The subsurface power requirements 
include low voltage (480 and 1201208 volts) distribution systems for construction and testing 
activities, and subsurface grounding. 
2.2.3 Busted Butte Compressed Air System 
The Busted Butte Compressed Air System provides a means of supplying pressurized air to the 
surface and subsurface for use mainly in construction operations. The system consists of a 
single, diesel air compressor located on the Busted Butte Pad, and piping and accessories that 
traverse into the underground facilities. The air compressor generates 175 cfm, and is used 
infrequently. 
2.2.4 Busted Butte Communication System 
The Busted Butte Communication System provides a means of linking the surface and 
subsurface areas, facilities, and outside commercial telephone communication systems. The 
surface system consists of a telephone link through the microwave system, a radio link with 
NTS, lines for computer use, and a link to the subsurface mine phones and telephone. 
2.2.5 Busted Butte Potable Water System 
Potable water is supplied to Busted Butte using five-gallon water bottles. 
2.2.6 Busted Butte Non-Potable Water System 
The Busted Butte Non-Potable Water System provides a means of storing water used in mining 
or drilling operations at Busted Butte in a surface storage tank. The system consists of a single 
surface tank located on the Busted Butte Pad, and piping and accessories that traverse into the 
underground facilities. Water is pumped from well 5-13 into trucks, transported to the Busted 
Butte Pad and pumped into the surface storage tank, and is then gravity fed or pumped to the 
underground facility. 
Busted Butte Surface Non-Potable Water System-The Busted Butte Surface Non-Potable 
Water System provides water to the Busted Butte Pad for use in construction operations and fire 
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protection. The system consists of a surface storage tank, piping and accessories, and portable 
fire extinguishers. 
Busted Butte Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable 
Water SystemThe Busted Butte Subsurface Fire Water System and subsurface portion of the 
Non-Potable Water System transfers water from the Surface Non-Potable Water System to the 
subsurface for use in construction operations and fire suppression. The system consists of the 
surface storage tank, piping and accessories that traverse into the underground facility, and 
portable fire extinguishers. 
2.2.7 Busted Butte Muck Storage System 
The Busted Butte Muck Storage System area provides an area for the storage of excavated rock 
from subsurface construction. The storage area is located at the southeast edge of the Busted 
Butte Pad, where muck is dumped over the edge of the pad. Muck is transported and dumped 
using diesel front-end loaders. Only small amounts of muck have been generated since the 
construction of the facility in early FY 1998. This muck was generated from a Phase 1 partial- 
mineback in FY 1999. Small amounts of muck will be generated for planned Phase 2 partial- 
minebacks during FY 200 1. 
2.2.8 Busted Butte Ground Support System 
The Busted Butte Ground Support System provides a means of structural support or 
reinforcement to the rock of excavated openings and protection to personnel and equipment 
against falls of ground within the excavated openings. The system consists of various types of 
rock bolts used in conjunction with welded wire fabric, rebar (up to 1 inch diameter), and 
shotcrete. Shotcrete pillars were used on the ribs for additional stability. Shotcrete pillars 
reinforced with rebar (I-inch diameter) were used at the intersection of the main adit and the test 
alcove for additional stability. An analysis was conducted by architectfengineer (AIE) Title I1 
design that confirmed the safety of the ground support system. There is no " Q  ground support 
in the Busted Butte facility. 
2.2.9 Busted Butte Sanitation System 
The Sanitation System at Busted Butte consists of a portable toilet located on the surface. The 
portable toilet is maintained by utilizing a sanitation pump truck. 
2.2.10 Busted Butte Subsurface Lighting System 
The Busted Butte Subsurface Lighting System provides illumination to subsurface areas 
including the main adit and test alcove. The system at Busted Butte consists of light fixtures, 
wiring, portable light fixtures, and exit and emergency lighting. 
2.2.11 Busted Butte Access Road System 
The Busted Butte Access Road System provides a link connecting the Busted Butte Test Facility 
to the NTS and the Area 25 road system. The system includes the 513 road (that connects to 
Stagecoach road through 40-Mile Wash) that connects to the Busted Butte access road. This 
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road system was constructed in early FY 1998 specifically for access to Busted Butte. Road 513 
connects to H-Road, a main, paved road in Area 25. 
2.2.12 Busted Butte Pad Drainage System 
The Busted Butte Pad Drainage System is a simple gravity system that provides a means to 
divert and transport storm water runoff on the Busted Butte Pad. The pad was designed to slope 
away from the portal, thereby prohibiting storm water runoff from entering the tunnel or ponding 
on the pad area. 
2.2.13 Busted Butte Security System 
The Security System at Busted Butte consists of two locked gates, one across the access road 
leading to the Busted Butte Pad; the other closing off the portal. These gates control access to 
the facility and provide protection to the Busted Butte facilities. Underground access during 
working hours is controlled by working personnel at the facility. No access is allowed without 
coordination with the site person in charge. 
2.2.14 Busted Butte TopsoiYRock Storage 
Busted Butte TopsoilRock Storage for the access road consists of a berm located along the road. 
The berm was leveled and seeded to be wind resistant, and provides the original topsoil for 
covering the road during final remediation of the Busted Butte facility. The muck storage area at 
the Busted Butte Pad provides the area for placement of excavated materials from underground, 
as discussed previously. 
2.2.15 Busted Butte Data Acquisition System 
The Busted Butte Data Acquisition System provides a means for the Principal Investigator 
organization and Test Coordination Office to collect data from testing equipment located 
underground at Busted Butte. Data is collected manually, automatically, and using a real-time 
data collection network via telephone. Using the real-time system, data can be collected by 
scientists located in Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico. An extensive Uninterruptible 
Power Supply system provides up to several days of power backup in case of power interruption. 
Standby power is provided to the Data Collection System by one of two generators located on 
the Busted Butte Pad. 
2.2.16 Busted Butte Parking Areas 
Busted Butte Parking Areas provide spaces and allowances for vehicle parking necessary to 
support operations and testing. There are parking areas on the main Busted Butte Pad near the 
trailers, and at a satellite pad on the access road located just down the hill from the main pad. 
2.2.17 Busted Butte Operations Building 
There are trailers on the Busted Butte Pad that provide office structures that support Busted Butte 
personnel. Personnel also use ESF operations buildings that are DOE-owned temporary trailers 
located on the North Portal Pad. 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 2-9 January 2002 
2.2.18 Busted Butte Systems Not Addressed 
The following systems discussed in the ESFDR (YMP 1997) are not addressed since they are not 
present in the current Busted Butte configuration: Covered Storage, Guard House, Surface 
Conveyor System, Load Management System, Facility Monitoring and Control System, and 
Subsurface Monitoring and Warning System. In addition, unlike the ESF, there is no Conveyor 
System, Waste Water System, Material and Personnel Handling System, Switchgear Building, 
Change House, Explosive Storage, Warehouse, Shop Building, or Visitors Center. 
2.3 NORTH LAS VEGAS TEST FACILITY 
The YMP currently occupies two buildings within the North Las Vegas Facility, also known as 
the "Atlas" facilities, to conduct testing. The buildings are leased and permitted through DOE 
from Bechtel Nevada and all facilities are built and maintained according to state and local codes 
and regulations. Any modifications to infrastructure or facility conditions are made through the 
Bechtel Nevada contract. 
The testing being conducted in these buildings is related to the Engineered Barrier Systems and 
Waste Package studies. Specifically, this testing involves: 
Soil properties testing in a laboratory environment 
A small scale thermal-hydrological-chemical test 
Scale thermal tests on various drip shield and backfill concepts 
A 40-m long thermaVventilation experiment 
All testing activities are routine and comparable to activities conducted at the ESF; they pose no 
extraordinary or unusual potential hazards beyond what is inherent to the baseline field-testing 
program. 
2.4 OTHER AREA 25 SUPPORT FACILITIES 
2.4.1 Batch Plant 
The batch plant and the associated casting plant are located in Area 25 of the NTS, south of H- 
road and approximately one-half mile east of Forty Mile Wash. The plant provides batch 
concrete for foundations and pours needed by the ESF, and supplies concrete to the casting yard 
to the west. Inverts for the main ESF drift were cast in the yard. The batch plant is a standard 
industry configuration consisting of storage bins, tanks, hoppers, conveyors, and system controls 
needed to dry batch concrete for truck delivery. Additionally, the plant includes a chiller system, 
ice storage, and testing laboratory. The casting yard includes invert molds, a steam plant, rebar 
process area, casting bed, steam lines, tanks, and various office buildings. Water and power are 
provided to the plant and the yard to support the processes only. Drinking water is provided in 
jugs and portable toilet facilities are located nearby. Currently, these facilities are closed and 
access is controlled. 
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2.4.2 Borrow Pit 
The borrow pit is located in Area 25 of the NTS, west of H-Road and approximately one-half 
mile in a northerly direction from the H-Road crossing of Forty Mile Wash. The borrow pit is 
the source of all Project aggregate. The borrow pit is a standard aggregate production operation 
in keeping with industrial practice. Facilities present consist of a shaker plant, sizing screens, 
and a stockpile conveyor. A diesel generator provides power and dust control water is drawn 
from an on-site tank. No outside service or utilities are available. Drinking water is provided in 
jugs and portable toilet facilities are located nearby. 
2.4.3 Lower Muck Storage Area 
The lower muck storage area is located in Area 25 of the NTS, north of H-Road and 
approximately one-half mile southeast of the ESF Pad. Muck has never been stored at the Lower 
Muck Storage Area. This storage area is for the accumulation of materials, supplies, and 
equipment not currently in use at the ESF. Items no longer in use are to be sold or transferred to 
other agencies as excess. A limited number of transportainers and boxcars are present and being 
utilized for protected storage. No services or utilities are present. 
2.4.4 Subdock 
The Subdock is located in Area 25 of the NTS, along the south side of H-Road and 
approximately one mile west of the turnoff to the ESF North Portal Pad. This area is used for the 
accumulation of drilling related materials, supplies, and equipment (tanks, drill rigs, tubing, 
generators, he1 tanks, etc.) not currently in use at the ESF. Items no longer in use are to be sold 
or transferred to other agencies as excess. A limited number of transportainers and boxcars are 
present and are utilized for protected storage. An office, a shop, and craft locker room 
transportainers are also present. A diesel generator provides power to the shop, office, and other 
buildings as needed. No outside service or utilities are available. Drinking water is provided in 
jugs and portable toilet facilities are located nearby. 
2.4.5 Non-Hazardous Waste Management Area (NWMA) 
The NWMA is located in Area 25 of the NTS, on the north side of H-Road and approximately 
one and one-quarter miles west of the turnoff to the ESF North Portal Pad. The NWMA is the 
collection and off-site shipment facility for non-hazardous wastes, including waste petroleum 
hydrocarbons, used batteries, oily rags, and oil contaminated soil. The area also houses the oily 
water skimming system and the supply of barrels and tanks used to collect and store the various 
wastes. The wastes are contained within a fenced area and all fluid wastes are placed in 
secondary containment. Officelfield lab transportainer and materials storage boxcars are 
adjacent to the fenced area. Line power is provided to the officelfield lab and yard. No water is 
piped to the yard. Drinking water is provided in jugs and portable toilet facilities are located 
nearby. 
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2.4.6 Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard 
The terrestrial ecosystem (i.e., environmental) storage yard is located in Area 25 of the NTS, on 
the north side of H-Road and approximately one and one-half miles west of the turnoff to the 
ESF North Portal Pad. This storage yard houses the reclamation materials, supplies, and 
equipment used to re-seed areas disturbed by testing, construction, and operations once they are 
no longer needed. Various farm implements, an office trailer, storage boxcar, and hay storage 
are located at this site. Line power is provided to the office trailer. No water is piped to the 
yard. Drinking water is provided in jugs and portable toilet facilities are located nearby. 
2.4.7 Fran Ridge 
Fran hdge is the site of the large block test performed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. It is 
located in Area 25 of the NTS, west of the Yucca Crest road and approximately one and three- 
quarter miles southwest of the H-Road and Yucca Crest Road intersection. This facility is closed 
with no current plans for reactivation. 
2.4.8 Boreholes 
Yucca Mountain Project boreholes are located primarily in Area 25 and at various locations on 
and off the NTS. More than, approximately, 350 YMP boreholes exist. The general 
configuration at each borehole site includes a pad and a capped and secured casing stickup. 
These boreholes are used for below ground testing. No outside service or utilities are available. 
Instrument shelters are present at four borehole sites. When active, a shelter is powered by a 
diesel-fueled generator. The generators and their fuel tanks are located within containment. All 
borehole sites are visited on a set schedule to assess their condition and security. 
2.4.9 Heliports 
Two heliports are currently available for YMP use in Area 25 of the NTS: the Central Support 
Area and ESF Pad Heliports. The Central Support Area Pad Heliport is available for emergency 
medical service landings and guest helicopter visits. The ESF Pad Heliport is located east of the 
northern half of the North Portal Pad. The landing pad is a concrete slab approximately 100 feet 
by 100 feet. A wheel-mounted fire extinguisher is present for emergencies. The ESF Pad 
Heliport is available for emergency medical service landings and guest helicopter visits. No 
outside service or utilities are available. The Central Support Area heliport is located west of 
Second Street between "A" and "B" streets. The landing pad is an asphalt slab approximately 
100 feet by 100 feet. A wheel-mounted fire extinguisher is present for emergencies. 
2.4.10 Access Roads 
The YMP access roads within the YMP site (i.e., the Ranch Area) are located within Area 25 of 
the NTS, primarily west of Forty Mile Wash. These roads consist of the paved H-road which 
provides primary access to the ESF; two short, paved extensions leading from H-Road to the 
North and South Portal Pads; and various unimproved dirt and gravel roads that provide access 
to the boreholes and surface testing locations. These roads are the primary routes of access for 
the performance of surface site characterization and underground facilities. One concrete low- 
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water crossing section is provided in Forty Mile Wash. The low-water crossing section is 
provided to resist erosion and destruction of the road surface in the wash during winter flooding. 
No services or utilities are involved. 
2.4.1 1 Meteorological Tower Complex 
The meteorological tower complex is located in Area 25 of the NTS, one-half mile southeast of 
the H-Road, South Portal road turnoff. This facility supports the meteorological monitoring and 
data collection activities for the YMP site. Several trailers and an instrument shelter are located 
on-site. Line power is provided to the site. No other utilities are provided. Drinking water is 
provided in jugs and portable toilet facilities are located nearby. 
2.4.12 Gas Station 
The gas station is located in Area 25 of the NTS, Central Support Area, at the corner of Second 
and "E" streets. This facility provides fuel for the YMP on-site vehicles. The site consists of a 
gas station building (Bldg. 4838), a 10,000-gallon, above-ground fuel tank, gasoline dispensing 
system, and various service aprons. With the exception of a small, northeast corner office 
housing data relay equipment, the building is not utilized by the YMP. Line power is provided 
to the facility and water is available for vehicle needs. No sanitary facility is available. A spill 
kit is located near the outside, southeast comer of the building, with an emergency phone at the 
outside, northeast building comer. A spill plan and operating procedures are in place for the 
above-ground tank. 
2.4.13 Mine Rescue 
The Mine Rescue Facility is located in Area 25 of the NTS, Central Support Area, at the comer 
of Third and "C" streets. The facility includes a single building (Bldg. 4919) and fenced storage 
yard. This facility is used for the maintenance and storage of YMP mine rescue equipment and 
the training of mine rescue personnel. All available services and utilities (water, power, and 
sanitation) are provided. A secondary, alternate mine rescue equipment storage and staging area 
is provided in the ESF Change House (Bldg. 5008). 
2.4.14 University of Nevada Reno (UNR) Seismic Studies 
The UNR seismic studies facility is located in Area 25 of the NTS, Central Support Area, on " D  
street between Second and First streets. The facility includes a single building (Bldg. 4314) and 
fenced storage yard. This facility is used for the maintenance and storage of UNR seismic 
monitoring equipment and supplies. Occupancy by UNR personnel is sporadic. All available 
services and utilities (water, power, and sanitation) are provided. 
2.4.15 Central Support 
The Central Support area is comprised of the Sample Management Facility, the Hydrologic 
Research Facility (HRF), and the Site Maintenance Building, as described in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Sample Management Facility - The Sample Management Facility is located at the Central 
Support Area within Area 25. The mission of the Sample Management Facility is to provide a 
controlled location to archive geologic and hydrologic samples that have been collected under 
the appropriate YMP quality procedures and to provide a location to manipulate (cut, shape, 
andlor polish) the samples. The facility consists of two buildings. The main building consists of 
office areas, sample examinations areas, warehouse area, two refrigerated walk-in coolers, and 
an area for conducting lapidary operations. The second building is equipped for sample storage 
in a warehouse area as well as a small area for storing consumables, (i.e., extra plastic and or 
canvas sample collection bags, tape, and other sample packaging materials). Both facilities are 
centrally heated and cooled and equipped with potable water for the drinking fountains and the 
toilet facilities. 
Hydrologic Research Facility-The HRF is a single structure which contains separate areas used 
as hydrologic laboratories. The U.S. Geological Survey resides in the building and uses the labs 
to conduct tests utilizing Yucca Mountain geologic samples and water collected from the various 
water wells. These samples were previously collected in accordance with YMP quality 
procedures. No hazardous laboratory operations are conducted in the facility and all laboratory 
processes are conducted in accordance with technical procedures. This facility is centrally 
heated and cooled and equipped with potable water for the drinking fountains and the toilet and 
lab facilities. 
Site Maintenance Building-The Site Maintenance Building is a single structure which contains 
separate hydrologicltesting support areas. The U.S. Geological Survey resides in the building as 
well, and uses the areas to supplement the testing utilizing Yucca Mountain geologic samples 
and water collected from the various water wells in accordance with YMP quality procedures. 
No hazardous laboratory operations are conducted in the facility. Small scale metal-working and 
welding process are conducted in the facility in accordance with approved procedures and 
processes. This facility is centrally heated and cooled and equipped with potable water for the 
drinking fountains and the toilet facilities. 
2.5 OFFICES, SCIENCE CENTERS, AND WAREHOUSE FACILITIES 
The YMP leases office buildings in Las Vegas, Nevada, in Vienna, Virginia, and in Washington, 
D.C. These leased facilities are commercial office buildings that meet all applicable building 
codes and standards. The building owners are responsible for maintaining these buildings and 
ensuring that they continue to meet all applicable codes and standards. The YMP activities that 
are performed in these buildings are engineering analyses, design, and business administrative; 
all of these activities are within the intended purpose of these buildings. The YMP leases office 
buildings in Las Vegas, Pahrump, and Beatty, Nevada, for use as Science Centers to educate and 
provide YMP information to the public. The Science Centers consist of displays and literature 
that describe the Project to the public and are consistent with the intended operations of these 
leased facilities. In addition, the YMP leases a warehouse (on Arville St.) in Las Vegas, which 
also meets all applicable building codes and standards. This warehouse is used for shipping and 
receiving as well as to store computer equipment and office furnishings. The warehouse owner 
is responsible for ensuring that the warehouse continues to meet all applicable codes and 
standards, and the YMP only uses it for its intended purpose. 
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3. HAZARD BASELINE 
3.1 HAZARD BASELINE METHODOLOGY 
The guidance on hazard baseline documentation involving the identification and control of 
radiological and non-radiological hazards is provided in DOE-EM-STD-5502-94. This standard 
contains criteria for the grouping of facilities into nuclear, radiological, non-nuclear, or industrial 
classifications. Facilities are grouped to determine the type, grading, and complexity of the 
documentation required for hazard identification and control (and the corresponding review and 
approval process). Figure A-1 provides a flowchart that illustrates the DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 
guidance for the baseline grouping for a facility. 
3.1.1 Radiological Inventory Assessment Methodology 
The criteria for determining the radiological hazard categorization of a facility are provided in 
DOE-STD-1027-92. In DOE Order 5480.23, three hazard categories are defined. A facility is 
designated as Hazard Category 1 if an analysis of hazards indicates that there is a potential for 
significant off-site consequences; Hazard Category 2 if the hazard analysis indicates that there is 
a potential for significant on-site consequences; and Hazard Category 3 if the analysis indicates 
that a potential exists for significant localized consequences only. A facility that does not exceed 
the Hazard Category 3 threshold criteria, but possesses radioactive materials whose potentially 
releasable inventory quantities meet or exceed the Reportable Quantity (RQ) levels listed in 
Appendix B of 40 CFR 302.4, is designated a Radiological Facility. 
The inventory assessment conducted to determine the hazard categorization is performed without 
credit taken for engineered features or ACs. Examples of engineered features and ACs include 
specific facility features (not including site location) such as building containment, stacks, 
equipment, systems, actions, or operating conditions that are established to control risk. 
In general, the radiological evaluation is accomplished by comparing the inventory of each 
radionuclide to the Threshold Quantity (TQ) levels provided in Table A.l of DOE-STD-1027-92. 
In addition, the quantity of mixed fission products is also considered. If the radionuclide 
inventory of a facility meets or exceeds the Hazard Category 3 TQs provided in Table A.l, the 
facility is classified as a Nuclear Facility. Facilities that do not meet or exceed the Hazard 
Category 3 TQs are evaluated to determine if they should be classified as a Radiological Facility, 
a Non-Nuclear Facility, or an Other Industrial Facility. The criteria for differentiating between a 
Non-Nuclear Facility and an Industrial Facility are provided in Section 3.1.2 of this report. 
Once a facility is determined to be a Nuclear Facility, a specific hazard categorization is 
determined. The criteria for determining the hazard categorization of nuclear facilities based on 
the radiological evaluations are established as follows: 
Hazard Category 1 
The facility has the potential for significant off-site consequences based on total curie 
(Ci) content, potential material forms, and maximum energy for dispersion available. 
Only Category A Reactors or facilities designated by the Program Secretarial Officer are 
designated as Hazard Category 1 in accordance with DOE-STD- 1027-92. 
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Hazard Category 2 
The quantity of any radionuclide exceeds the Hazard Category 2 TQs provided in 
Table A.l of DOE-STD-1027-92. This quantity is based on 1 rem at 100 m (on-site) as 
determined in 10 CFR 30 and modified by DOE. 
The minimum critical mass limit for any fissile material as specified in ANSIIANS 8.1 is 
exceeded. 
The total quantity of mixed fission products, where the individual radionuclides have 
been determined, is greater than 1000 Ci. 
Where there are combinations of radioactive materials, the sum of the ratios of the 
quantity of each radionuclide to the Hazard Category 2 thresholds exceeds 1 .O. 
Hazard Category 3 
The quantity of any radionuclide exceeds the Hazard Category 3 TQs provided in 
Table A.l of DOE-STD-1027-92. This quantity is based on 10 rem at 30 m for a 
24-hour exposure. 
Where there are combinations of radioactive materials, the sum of the ratios of the 
quantity of each radionuclide to the Hazard Category 3 thresholds exceeds 1 .O. 
The criteria for determining if a facility is a Radiological Facility follow: 
Radiological Facility 
Where there are combinations of radioactive materials, the sum of the ratios of the 
quantity of each radionuclide to the Hazard Category 3 thresholds is less than 1.0 but the 
facility contains radioactive materials whose potentially releasable RQ levels meet or 
exceed 40 CFR 302.4, Appendix B, levels. 
Non-Nuclear or Other Industrial 
The potentially releasable radionuclide inventory is below the RQ levels of 
40 CFR 302.4, Appendix B. The differentiation between non-nuclear and industrial is 
determined based on the chemical hazard evaluation. 
3.1.2 Chemical Inventory Assessment Methodology 
The assessment of the chemical inventory consists of a comparison of each chemical to the RQ 
levels reported in 40 CFR 302.4, the TQ levels reported in 29 CFR 1910.1 19, the TQ levels 
listed in 40 CFR 68, and the Threshold Planning Quantities (TPQs) reported in 40 CFR 355. The 
criteria for determining the facility baseline grouping based on the chemical evaluations are 
established as follows: 
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Non-Nuclear 
The hazardous material inventory meets or exceeds the TQ levels of 29 CFR 19 10.1 19. 
The hazardous material inventory meets or exceeds the TPQ levels of 40 CFR 355. 
The potentially releasable hazardous material meets or exceeds the RQ levels of 
40 CFR 302.4, Table 302.4. 
3.2 HIGH HAZARD CHEMICAL FACILITY 
The releasable radiological inventory is below the RQ levels for radiological materials, 
but has any gross chemical inventory greater than the TQ of 29 CFR 191 0.1 19 or 
40 CFR 68. If a chemical does not have a TQ, the TPQ levels of 40 CFR 355 will be 
used. 
Low Hazard Chemical Facility 
The releasable radiological inventory is below the RQ levels of 40 CFR 302.4, 
Appendix B, for radiological materials; the gross chemical inventory is below the TQ 
levels of both 29 CFR 191 0.1 19 and 40 CFR 68; and releasable chemical inventory is at 
or above the RQ levels of 40 CFR 302.4, Table 302.4. If a chemical does not have a 
TQ, the TPQ levels of 40 CFR 355 will be used. 
Industrial 
The potentially releasable hazardous material is below the RQ levels of 40 CFR 302.4, 
Table 302.4. 
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
3.3.1 The acetylene used at the ESF is stored in cylinders that hold 250 cubic feet of 
compressed gas. It is assumed in this analysis that each tank is full, and that this gas is 
stored at the industry standard pressure of 250 psi at 70°F. Under these conditions (250 
cubic feet of compressed acetylene at 250 psi and 70°F), 14.7 cubic feet of acetylene 
weighs one pound. 
NOTE: Assumption 3.3.1 is used in Appendix A, calculations H, I, J, and W 
3.3.2 Release Fractions (RFs) from Attachment 1 of DOE-STD-1027-92 were used to 
conservatively calculate the potentially releasable hazardous material quantities 
(radiological and chemical) for comparison with the RQ values of Table 302.4 
(chemicals) and Appendix B (radionuclides) of 40 CFR 302.4. Specifically, the 
following RFs were used. 
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Material RF 
Highly VolatilelCombustible 0.5 
Semi-volatile 1 .OE-02 
Unknown Form 1 .OE-02 
Nonvolatile Powder 1 .OE-03 
Nonvolatiles in non-flammable liquid 1 .OE-03 
NOTE: Assumption 3.3.2 is used in Appendix A, Tables A-2 and A-4. 
3.4 RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL INVENTORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
EVALUATION 
Radionuclides are present at Area 25 and at the YMP site characterization activities in the form 
of sealed radioactive solid sources as well as unsealed liquid sources. These sources are stored 
in approved radioactive material storage areas in the vicinity of the ESF pad. In Attachment 1 of 
DOE-STD-1027-92, it is stated that sealed radioactive sources that are engineered to pass the 
special form testing specified by the Department of Transportation, and are handled according to 
a source control policy, may be excluded from a summation of the radioactive inventory of a 
facility. 
To evaluate the unsealed sources, as per the Radiological Inventory Assessment Methodology, 
the inventory of these (unsealed) sources was compared to the Hazard Category 3 Thresholds 
presented in DOE-STD-1027-92. The results of this comparison are presented in Table A-1 in 
Appendix A. The inventory of unsealed sources was obtained from the Sealed Source and 
Radioactive Material Inventory (CRWMS M&O 2000). For conservatism, this evaluation 
assumed that all the sources were collocated. As per the methodology, the sum of the ratios of 
the quantity of each radionuclide to the Hazard Category 3 thresholds was calculated. Because 
the sum of the ratios did not exceed the value of 1.0, a hrther determination was required, as 
presented in Figure 1 in Appendix A. The potentially releasable radionuclide inventory was 
calculated using the same inventory and RFs obtained from Attachment 1 of DOE-STD-1027-92. 
The potentially releasable inventory was then compared to RQ levels for each radionuclide from 
Appendix B of 40 CFR 302.4. These calculations are presented in Table A-2 in Appendix A. 
The individual sources, as well as the sums of quantities of the same radionuclide sources in 
similar locations, are presented. No RQs were exceeded, whether the sources were examined as 
individual sources or as summed quantities of like sources. Based on these assessments of the 
radioactive inventories, the YMP site characterization activities are classified as Other Industrial. 
3.5 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INVENTORY AND ASSESSMENT 
The inventory of hazardous materials at the existing Area 25 facilities within the NTS, as well as 
all other facilities that support the YMP site characterization activities, is documented and 
maintained in the M&O Material Inventory Lotus Notes database. The hazardous materials 
inventory consists of quantities of chemicals and industrial products required for the various 
YMP activities, including chemicals used in various laboratories as well as those chemical and 
industrial products used in support of the ESF construction, testing, and sampling activities. 
These chemicals are listed and sorted in the M&O Material Inventory Lotus Notes database by 
their location, material name, organization, and material type. For completeness, the inventories 
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for all ESF facilities as well as all Area 25, NTS facilities, and other additional facilities that 
support the YMP site characterization activities (and had inventories documented in the Lotus 
Notes database), were included in this assessment. The inventories of off-site facilities (such as 
the Atlas Facility, the Beatty Science Center) were also considered. An initial screening of the 
inventory was performed. The following criteria were used to eliminate certain chemicals and 
products in the database listing: 
"Any substance to the extent it is used for personal, family, or household purposes, or is 
present in the same form and concentration as a product packaged for distribution and 
use by the general public," can be eliminated from being categorized as a hazardous 
chemical in accordance with 40 CFR 355.20. This category would include such items as 
cleaners, paints, toners, mstmaster, diesel fiel, adhesives, welding materials, and 
petroleum jelly. 
The material is used in a laboratory setting, in laboratory-scale quantities. This category 
would also include such items as buffer solutions, resin, glove dust, indicator solutions, 
and silica gel. The exclusion of laboratory materials is consistent with 40 CFR 355.20, 
where the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency definition of "hazardous chemicals" 
specifically excludes "any substance to the extent it is used in a research laboratory or a 
hospital or other medical facility under the direct supervision of a technically qualified 
individual." Laboratory setting and laboratory quantities are defined in 29 CFR 
19 10.1450. "'Laboratory' means a facility where 'laboratory use of hazardous 
chemicals' occurs. It is a workplace where relatively small quantities of hazardous 
chemicals are used on a non-production basis." '"Laboratory scale' means work with 
substances in which the containers used for reactions, transfers, and other handling of 
substances are designed to be easily and safely manipulated by one person. 'Laboratory 
scale' excludes those workplaces whose function is to produce commercial quantities of 
materials." For completeness, all quantities of chemicals and chemical solutions were 
included in the evaluation of the hazardous material inventory; and the standard 
solutions, buffer solutions, and other common laboratory items were screened out. 
Oil is excluded from the definition of a hazardous material in accordance with DOE 
Order 5480.23. 
Explosives were screened from consideration because these materials are not 
manufactured at the ESF. Storage and use of explosives are addressed by 
29 CFR 1910.109 and are common industrial hazards. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration has issued an interpretation stating that only the manufacture of 
explosives is addressed by 29 CFR 191 0.1 19, not the storage and use of these materials 
(Miles 1998). 
Gasoline and diesel fiel were screened from consideration because they are exempt 
from consideration under 29 CFR 19 10.1 19 and 40 CFR 68. 
The hazardous materials selected for evaluation are listed in Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix A. 
The North Las Vegas Test Facility is the only non-ESF facility with chemical inventories 
requiring evaluation. 
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3.6 CHEMICAL HAZARDS EVALUATION 
As per the Chemical Inventory Assessment Methodology, the chemicals in the hazardous 
material inventory for the YMP (Area 25 and North Las Vegas Test Facility), that were selected 
for evaluation, were compared to the TPQs of 40 CFR 355, the TQs of 40 CFR 68.130, and the 
TQs of 29 CFR 191 0.1 19, and are presented in Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix A. None of 
these chemicals exceeded any of the available TPQs or TQs listed in these CFRs. 
Additionally, the Chemical Inventory Assessment Methodology, in accordance with DOE-STD- 
EM-5502-94, stipulates that a comparison be made between the potentially releasable quantities 
of the chemicals in the hazardous material inventory selected for evaluation and the RQs (if 
available for these chemicals) listed in Table 302.4 of 40 CFR 302. The inventory quantities of 
the chemicals that have RQs available in Table 302.4 were multiplied by the appropriate RFs to 
obtain the potentially releasable quantities. As discussed in Assumption 3.3.2, RFs from 
Attachment 1 of DOE-STD-1027-92 were used in this analysis. Specifically: 
An RF of 0.5 was used for volatile chemicals such as toluene. 
1 .OE-02 was used for semi-volatile chemicals (semi-volatile liquids such as hydrochloric 
acid or nitric acid) and chemicals of unknown form (such as mercury, which is a liquid 
metal with a very low vapor pressure). 
1.OE-03 was used for nonvolatile powders (chemicals stored in powder form, such as 
sodium hydroxide) and nonvolatiles in non-flammable liquid (such as solutions of 
sodium hydroxide). 
Therefore, the inventories of these chemicals were multiplied by the appropriate RFs to obtain 
the quantities of their inventories that are potentially releasable, and these inventories were 
compared to the RQs of Table 302.4 of 40 CFR 302. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Tables A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A. In each case, the potentially releasable quantity of the 
chemical was less than the respective 40 CFR 302 RQ limit. 
3.7 HAZARD BASELINE DETERMINATION 
Sealed and unsealed radioactive sources are used in YMP site characterization activities; 
however, some sealed sources are exempt fiom consideration because they meet sealed-source 
guidelines discussed in DOE-STD-1027-92. An evaluation of the unsealed sources presented in 
Table A-1 in Appendix A demonstrated that there are no radionuclides present in quantities that 
are greater than the associated Hazard Category 3 threshold quantities, and the YMP site 
characterization activities are not classified as a Nuclear Facility or as a Radiological Facility. A 
comparison of the releasable quantities of radionuclides to the Appendix B RQs of 40 CFR 302.2 
resulted in a classification of Other Industrial Facility. 
An evaluation comparing the inventories of potentially hazardous chemicals to the TPQs, and 
TQs, is provided in Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix A. A comparison of the potentially 
releasable quantities of chemicals (having available RQs in Table 302.4 of 40 CFR 302) to the 
RQs (presented in Tables A-5 and A-6 in Appendix A), determined that none of these quantities 
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exceeded the RQ limits. In accordance with the classification criteria, the Area 25 facilities 
within the NTS that support the site characterization activities have a chemical hazard 
classification of Industrial Facility. 
3.8 HAZARD BASELINE CONCLUSION 
The radiological analysis performed in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 demonstrates that 
the inventory of radiological materials at the Area 25 facilities within the NTS, is less than the 
Hazard Category 3 threshold limits and, in accordance with DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, is therefore 
not a Nuclear Facility. In addition, the comparison of the radiological inventory to the RQs of 40 
CFR 302.4, Appendix B, demonstrates that, in accordance with DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, the 
facility is not a Radiological Facility, but instead is an Other Industrial Facility. The chemical 
analysis performed in accordance with DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 does not result in a classification 
of Non-Nuclear Facility, High-Hazard Chemical Facility, or Low-Hazard Chemical Facility; 
instead, it results in a chemical hazard classification of Industrial Facility. 
These analyses are based on the appropriate radiological and chemical inventories currently 
present at the Area 25 facilities within the NTS, as well as the other facilities that support the 
YMP site characterization activities. The M&O Material Inventory on the Lotus Notes database 
provides the accountable radioactive sources and the chemical inventories. The results and 
conclusions of this assessment are not valid for radiological or chemical inventories greater than 
those used in these analyses. 
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INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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4. SYSTEM DESIGN AND HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
4.1 DESIGN PROCESS 
The design control process establishes a means by which safety features are engineered into the 
AIE design, in addition to requirements established by national consensus codes and standards, 
Project requirements, etc. In conjunction with the design effort, System Safety Analyses are 
performed to identify and evaluate hazards associated with the system. The ESF systems 
discussed in Section 2 have been constructed by one of three methods: 
A/E designed system was installed 
System was designed and installed under Alternate Construction (see Section4.2) 
System was installed as a constructor-hrnished temporary stmc ture 
At a minimum, all systems are mandated to meet the requirements established in 29 CFR 1926, 
Safety and Health Regulations for Construction (Dyer 1998). 
4.2 ALTERNATE CONSTRUCTION 
To enhance ESF TS Loop TBM productivity, and to defer costs associated with procurement and 
installation of A/E designed systems, an alternative approach was adopted for the design and 
installation of construction utilities. Rather than install the A/E systems that were designed for 
multiple simultaneous construction headings, testing, and operations activities, Alternate 
Construction allowed the Constructor to select and install construction systems similar to those 
used in commercial tunneling systems. These systems were the responsibility of the Constructor, 
and were intended to be replaced by the A/E designed utility systems for ESF operations after the 
breakthrough of the TBM at the South Portal. However, following the breakthrough, the 
decision was made to evaluate the systems for continued use. These evaluations were made in 
Title I11 Evaluation Reports (see Section4.3). 
4.3 TITLE I11 EVALUATION REPORTS 
Following completion of ESF TS Loop TBM operations, a plan was implemented to evaluate 
systems installed under Alternate Construction and determine if modifications to the systems 
andlor the system design were recommended to reduce costs, improve operational effectiveness, 
or comply with current regulations and requirements. These results were summarized in Title I11 
Evaluation Reports. These reports evaluated 15 ESF systems: 
Conveyor System 
Subsurface Lighting System 
Material and Personnel Handling System 
Access Road System 
Non-Q Ground Support 
Sanitation System 
Muck Storage 
Security System 
Surface and Subsurface Communication System 
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Surface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System 
Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System 
Surface and Subsurface Power System 
North Portal Pad Drainage 
Waste Water System 
Compressed Air System 
The scope of the Title I11 Evaluation Reports included the following primary tasks: 
Compare the as-constructed system with the baseline design 
Compare the as-constructed system with the baseline requirements (ESFDR) 
Compare the as-constructed system with operating permit(s) requirements 
Compare the as-constructed system with environmental and safety requirements 
Determine the required as-constructed documents 
Identify additional design and construction work 
Provide cost and schedule estimates for recommended additional work 
Following completion of the Title I11 Evaluation Reports, an evaluation of the recommended 
additional work was performed by System Safety to determine what work could be deferred and 
not create, or fail to correct, an unacceptable risk to personnel (Gwyn 1999b). 
As an Industrial Facility, the hazards tend to be well known, well understood, and well 
characterized. The design, construction, and operations required to mitigate or prevent these 
hazards are addressed with national consensus codes and standards. Therefore, the hazards 
analyses for Industrial Facilities are included in the analyses performed for the design. These 
design analyses include a System Safety Analysis, Preliminary Hazards Analysis, and a Fire 
Hazards Analysis. 
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5. FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
5.1 FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the methodology for identifying functions (and the SSCs or ACs that are 
credited with performing these functions) that reduce the risk to the public and workers from 
uncontrolled releases of radioactive and other hazardous materials. In addition, it provides the 
methodology for assigning FCLs to SSCs. Functional Classification is a graded classification 
system used to determine the minimum requirements for SSCs (i.e., requirements for design, 
operation, procurement, and maintenance). The four FCLs, in order of precedence, are specified 
as FCLs 1 through 4. While FCLl and FCL2 are selected based on the safety function 
performed by an SSC, FCL3 is based on functions that are essential to performing the Project 
mission. FCL4 includes all SSCs not included in FCL1, FCL2, and FCL3. This methodology 
applies to the classification of SSCs in existing facilities, new facilities, and modifications to 
existing facilities. 
The Functional Classification process reviews the functions performed by the SSCs. An FCL is 
assigned to an SSC based on this review and the criteria described below. SSCs may perform 
multiple functions; therefore, more than one of these criteria may apply. An SSC is assigned the 
highest applicable classification level based on a review of its hc t ions  against these criteria. 
Consequently, the functions of an SSC are reviewed against all criteria, from highest to lowest, 
and the SSC is assigned an FCL based on the highest applicable criteria. 
SSCs often perform a function to prevent or mitigate common industrial hazards. Common 
industrial hazards are defined as materials or energy sources that are routinely encountered in 
general industry and construction, and for which national consensus codes and/or standards (e.g., 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and transportation safety) exist and have been 
implemented to guide safe design, construction, and operation. During the hazard identifications 
processes routinely used in the DOE Complex, common industrial hazards are not typically 
evaluated. However, they are evaluated to the extent that they could act as initiators and/or 
contributors to events that potentially could result in a radiological or chemical release. This 
methodology is followed to clearly delineate the level of control placed on those SSCs used to 
mitigate hazards. Hazards that are unique to the DOE Complex, and thus require a more 
rigorous level of control, are addressed in a Hazard Analysis and in a Functional Classification 
process. Hazards common to industry are controlled through the implementation of national 
consensus codes and/or standards. Therefore, functions performed by SSCs to mitigate common 
industrial hazards are not considered when assigning an FCL. 
5.1.1 Functional Classification Criteria 
5.1.1.1 FCLl 
Loss of hc t ions  of SSCs that prevent or mitigate hazards common to the mining and/or 
tunneling industries are not considered in this classification process. These hazards are included 
in those hazards referred to as common industrial hazards. However, if adverse consequences to 
the public result from a hazard unique to the YMP, and if these consequences result from the loss 
of function of an SSC, the function of that SSC must be considered in this definition. For the 
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purposes of Functional Classification, the public is considered to be individuals located at or 
beyond the site boundary. 
The FCLl functional and safety classification applies to those functions performed by SSCs or 
ACs whose failure to perform their defined functions could: 
Result in an exposure to an individual member of the public to airborne concentrations 
of a chemical hazard equal to or greater than Emergency Response Planning Guideline 2 
Cause serious injury or death to a member of thepublic (fatal injury) 
Cause severe long-term damage to the environment beyond the site boundary 
Loss of functions of SSCs that prevent or mitigate common industrial hazards such as those 
associated with mining andlor tunneling industries (for the ESF) are not considered in this 
classification process. However, if adverse consequences to the public result from a hazard 
unique to the YMP, and if these consequences result from the loss of function of an SSC, the 
fimction of that SSC must be considered in this definition. 
The FCL2 functional and safety classification applies to those functions performed by SSCs and 
ACs whose failure could result in: 
Exposure to a chemical hazard in airborne concentrations equal to or greater than 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline 2 
Serious injury or death to a worker 
Minor injury or illness to a member of the off-site public 
Severe long-term damage to the environment within the site boundary 
Loss of use of major facility functions or processes resulting in severe mission or 
economic impact 
Based on a qualitative evaluation in a Hazard Analysis, such a failure could result in a prompt 
worker (any worker group) fatality or serious injury from consequences where the primary threat 
is not from exposure to radioactive or toxic material. 
The FCL3 classification applies to those SSC and AC functions whose loss or failure could have 
an unacceptable impact on a facility by causing damage to the facility or a process resulting in 
serious mission or economic impact. 
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5.1.1.4 FCLA 
The FCL4 functional and safety classification is assigned to all SSCs not required to provide an 
FCL1, FCL2, or FCL3 function. Failure of an FCL4 SSC or AC function would have no 
probable impact on a worker or member of the off-site public, have no probable impact on the 
environment, and minimal impact to the facility mission. All SSC and AC functions are, as a 
minimum, classified as FCL4 to ensure that proper design, operations, and maintenance 
requirements are assigned to provide for the health and safety of the worker and environment and 
to ensure compliance with other requirements. 
5.1.2 Functional Classification Process 
5.1.2.1 FCLl 
The FCLl classification only applies to Nuclear Facilities and High Hazard Chemical Facilities. 
Only these facilities have an inventory of hazardous material, if released, sufficient to result in 
off-site impacts in excess of the FCLl evaluation criteria. To determine if an SSC performs an 
FCLl function, the following steps are performed. 
First, a review of applicable documentation is undertaken to determine if there is a potential for 
exceeding FCLl criteria. All of the following conditions must exist for functions to be classified 
as FCL 1 : 
A sufficient inventory must exist, such that, if released in total, it would exceed FCLl 
criteria (Section 5.1.1.1). 
An exposure path and mechanism for release must exist. 
The frequency of the unmitigated release event must be considered credible. 
Finally, the FCLl functions that are required to meet the FCLl criteria are determined, as well as 
a determination of which SSCs or ACs perform the FCLl functions. 
The proposed list of SSCs and ACs is used to determine if the FCLl criteria are no lcyger 
exceeded with the respective SSCsIACs in place. The results of this analysis are provided to the 
Responsible Engineer to either c o n f m  the correct identification of SSCs and ACs or to revise 
the list (add or delete). This process continues until the selection of SSCs and ACs ensures that 
the FCLl criteria are met. The SSCs selected through this process are classified as FCL1. The 
FCLl criteria should not be viewed as a "speed limit"; instead, it is preferred that the mitigated 
analysis results be "well below" the respective criteria guidelines. However, there may be 
unusual cases where the cost involved in necessary facility modifications to meet the FCLl 
criteria cannot be justified. These results must be documented in the facility Safety Basis Report 
and agreed to by the DOE, as indicated by the DOE approval of the Safety Basis Report. 
The FCL2 selection of SSCs and ACs is performed after completion of the FCLl selections. 
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The FCL2 classification applies to Nuclear Facilities and those Radiological, High Hazard 
Chemical, Low Hazard Chemical, and Industrial Facilities with unique hazards not considered to 
be common industrial hazards. 
First, a review of applicable documentation is performed to determine if there is a potential for 
exceeding the FCL2 criteria (Section 5.1.1.2). 
Finally, the FCL2 functions that are required to meet FCL2 criteria are selected (Section 5.1.1.2), 
as well as a determination of which SSCs or ACs perform the FCL2 functions, in the same 
manner as was performed for the FCLl functions. 
The FCL3 SSCIAC selections are performed after completion of the FCL2 selections. 
A review of the applicable documentation (e.g., Design, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Work 
Instructions, and the Emergency Plan) is performed to determine the SSCs and ACs that are 
required to meet the FCL3 criteria (Section 5.1.1.3). 
The FCL3 classification is applied only to the SSCs required to meet the FCL3 functions. 
Unlike the applications required for the FCLl and FCL2 classifications, the supporting SSCs 
(required to ensure that the required function can be provided or to ensure that the required 
function is not prevented) are not required to be classified as FCL3. 
5.1.2.4 FCLA 
As previously noted, all SSC and AC functions are, as a minimum, classified as FCL4 to ensure 
that proper design, operations, and maintenance requirements are assigned to provide for the 
health and safety of the worker and environment and to ensure compliance with other 
requirements. 
5.2 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
The systems that make up the YMP facilities (identified in Section 2) are classified in the 
following subsections using the functional classification criteria identified in Section 5.1.1. The 
results of these classifications are summarized in Tables 5-1 through 5-4). 
5.2.1 ESF System Classification 
The ESF systems identified in Section 2 are classified in the following subsections using the 
Functional Classification criteria identified in Section 5.1 .l .  The results of these classifications 
are summarized in Table 5- 1. 
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5.2.1.1 ESF Subsurface Ventilation System 
The ESF Subsurface Ventilation System mitigates hazards commonly associated with the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. The loss of the Ventilation System would not result in a life-threatening situation 
because there is a sufficient quantity of air to prevent asphyxiation, and the use of personal 
protective equipment mitigates the hazards associated with the accumulation of airborne 
hazardous materials. Furthermore, in the case of a loss of the Ventilation System, operations are 
halted and the tunnel is evacuated of personnel. However, the Ventilation System is necessary to 
conduct tunnel operations and any loss of the system could negatively impact the Project 
mission. The Ventilation System is classified as FCL3. 
Table 5-1. Functional Classification of ESF Systems 
Functional I SYSTEM DESCRIPTION I Classification 
Compressed Air 
Communication 
ECRB Refuge Chambers 
l ~ r o u n d  Support Q 
SAFETY ENVELOPE 
I 
l ~ r o u n d  Support Non-Q I FCL3 INIA 
l~ubsurface Ventilation I FCL3 INIA I 
l~u r face  Non-Potable Water I FCL3 JNIA 1 
Subsurface Fire and Non-Potable I FCL3 1 NIA I water 
I ~ a t a  Acauisition I FCL3 INIA I 
Conveyor 
Waste Water 
Material and Personnel Handling 
Potable Water 
l~ubsurface Liahtina I FCL4 INIA I 
Muck Storage 
Surface Sanitation 
Subsurface Sanitation 
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FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
January 2002 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
Table 5-1. Functional Classification of ESF Systems (Continued) 
NIA Not Applicable 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Access Roads 
North Portal Pad Drainage 
South Portal Pad Drainage 
Change House 
Switchgear Building 
Security System 
TopsoilIRock Storage 
Explosive Storage 
Parking Areas 
Warehouse 
Shop Building 
Operations Building 
ESF Visitors Center 
5.2.1.2 ESF Conveyor System 
The hazards associated with the ESF Conveyor System are mitigated by safety features that have 
been engineered into the equipment design and are required by national consensus codes and 
standards. The loss of the Conveyor System would not result in a life-threatening situation 
because the system does not provide a safety hnction to the facility. Loss of the Conveyor 
System would not negatively impact the Project mission because there are temporary areas 
available underground to store accumulated muck. The Conveyor System is classified as FCL4. 
Functional 
Classification 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
5.2.1.3 ESF Power System 
SAFETY ENVELOPE 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
The hazards associated with the ESF Power System are common to the tunnelinglrnining 
industry and are not unique to the site characterization activities. The loss of the Power System 
could result in an impact to the Project mission because the system is linked to other systems 
and must inherit the highest FCL of those systems. Reviewing Table 5-1, the highest FCL of 
systems fed by the Power System is FLC3 (ventilatioq refuge chambers, and compressed air). 
However, loss of the Power System would not affect the Compressed Air System because the 
Compressed Air System is backed up by a diesel-powered compressor. Therefore, the Power 
System is classified as FCL3. 
5.2.1.4 ESF Compressed Air System 
The hazards associated with the ESF Compressed Air System are common to the 
tunnelinglrnining industry. The loss of the Compressed Air System would not result in a serious 
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injury or death a the worker in the ECRB; however, loss of this system could have a negative 1 
impact on the Project mission The Compressed Air System is, therefore, classified as FCL3. 
5.2.1.5 ESF Waste Water System 
The hazards associated with the ESF Waste Water System are common to the tunnelinglmining 
industry and are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the Waste 
Water System would not result in a life-threatening situation because the system does not 
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provide a safety hnction to the facility. The loss of the Waste Water System would not 
negatively impact the Project mission because there are sumps and a tank available for 
temporary storage. The Waste Water System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.1.6 ESF Material And Personnel Handling System 
The hazards associated with the ESF Material and Personnel Handling System are common to 
the tunnelinglmining industry and are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The 
loss of the Material and Personnel Handling System would not result in a life-threatening 
situation because the system does not provide a safety function to the facility. The loss of the 
Material and Personnel Handling System would not negatively impact the Project mission 
because access to areas can be reached on foot. The Material and Personnel Handling System is 
classified as FCIA. 
5.2.1.7 ESF Communication System 
The b c t i o n  of the ESF Communication System is to mitigate consequences of a fire, which is a 
common industrial hazard. Failure of this function could adversely impact the Project's ability 
to complete its mission. Therefore, the Communication System is classified FCL3. 
5.2.1.8 ESF Potable Water System 
The ESF Potable Water System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities; loss of the 
system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Potable Water System is classified 
as FCL4. 
5.2.1.9 ESF Non-Potable Water System 
ESF Surface Non-Potable Water System-The ESF Surface Non-Potable Water System 
mitigates hazards commonly associated with the tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not 
unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the Surface Non-Potable Water 
System could adversely impact the Project mission because it provides incipient fire protection 
for the surface facilities. Therefore, Surface Non-Potable Water System is classified as FCL3. 
ESF Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water 
System-The ESF Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable 
Water System mitigates hazards commonly associated with the tunnelinglmining industry; these 
hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the Subsurface 
Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System could adversely 
impact the Project mission since it provides incipient fire protection underground. Therefore, 
Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System are 
classified as FCL3. 
5.2.1.10 ESF Muck Storage System 
The ESF Muck Storage System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. Loss of 
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this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Muck Storage System is 
classified as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.11 ESF Ground Support System 
The ESF Ground Support System mitigates hazards commonly associated with the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. Although a complete failure of the system is highly unlikely, the loss of a portion of 
the Ground Support System (i.e., a keyblock) could negatively impact the Project mission. 
Therefore, Ground Support System is classified as FCL3. 
I 5.2.1.12 ESF Sanitation System 
The ESF Sanitation System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. Loss of 
this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Sanitation System is classified 
as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.13 ESF Subsurface Lighting System 
The hazards associated with the ESF Subsurface Lighting System are common to the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. The loss of the Subsurface Lighting System would not present a life-threatening 
situation or negatively impact the Project mission because the use of personal protective 
equipment (i.e., a cap lamp) mitigates the hazards. The Subsurface Lighting System is classified 
as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.14 ESF Access Road System 
The ESF Access Road System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. Loss of the 
Access Road System would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Access Road System 
is classified as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.15 ESF North Portal Pad Drainage System 
The ESF North Portal Pad Drainage System does not provide a safety function to the facility and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. 
The loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The North Portal Pad 
Drainage System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.1.16 ESF South Portal Pad Drainage 
The ESF South Portal Pad Drainage System does not provide a safety function to the facility and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A 
loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The South Portal Pad 
Drainage System is classified as FCL4. 
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5.2.1.17 ESF Change House 
The hazards associated with the ESF Change House are common to the tunnelinglmining 
industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the 
Change House would not result in a life-threatening situation or negatively impact the Project 
mission because backups exist for both the mine rescue equipment and lockerlshower facilities. 
(NOTE: The Field Operations Center would need to be reopened in this event.) The Change 
House is classified as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.18 ESP Switchgear Building 
The hazards associated with the ESF Switchgear Building are common to the tunnelinglmining 
industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the 
Switchgear Building would not result in a life-threatening situation or negatively impact the 
Project mission because the Compressed Air System is backed-up by a diesel-powered 
compressor. The Switchgear Building is classified as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.19 ESF Security System 
The ESF Security System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not mitigate 
any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of this 
system would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Security System is classified as 
FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.20 ESF TopsoiYRock Storage 
The ESF TopsoiVRock Storage does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. TopsoiVRock Storage is classified 
as FCL4. 
5.2.1.21 ESF Explosive Storage Facility 
The ESF Explosive Storage Facility does not provide a safety function to the facility and does 
not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. The 
loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Explosive Storage is 
classified as FCL4. 
I 5.2.1.22 ESF Data Acquisition 
The ESF Data Acquisition System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. However, 
the loss of the Data Acquisition System could negatively impact the Project mission. Data 
Acquisition System is classified as FCL3. 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 January 2002 
5.2.1.23 ESF Parking Areas 
The ESF Parking Areas do not provide a safety function to the facility and do not mitigate any 
unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the Parking 
Areas would not negatively impact the Project mission. Parking Areas are classified as FCL4. 
5.2.1.24 ESF Warehouse 
The ESF Warehouse does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not mitigate any 
unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the 
Warehouse would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Warehouse is classified as 
FCL4. 
5.2.1.25 ESF Shop Building 
The ESF Shop Building does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not mitigate 
any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the Shop 
Building would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Shop Building is classified as 
FCL4. 
5.2.1.26 ESF Operations Building 
The ESF Operations Building does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
the Operations Building would not negatively impact the Project mission. The Operations 
Building is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.1.27 ESF Visitor Center 
The ESF Visitor Center does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not mitigate 
any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the ESF 
Visitor Center would not negatively impact the Project mission. The ESF Visitor Center is 
classified as FCL4. I 
5.2.1.28 ESF ECRB Refuge Chambers 
The function of the ESF ECRB Refuge Chambers is to mitigate the consequences of an 
underground fire in the ECRB cross-drift. The risk level of fire scenarios in the ECRB was 
evaluated in a System Safety Analysis. The Hazard Classification for the six scenarios evaluated 
in this report ranged from Low to Extremely Low (BSC 2001d). The refuge chambers at Alcove 
8 and behind the bulkhead at Station 17+63 at the page phone at Station 18+43 were cited as 
mitigative/control features required to obtain these Hazard Classifications. In the mining 
industry the most likely incident which would warrant the use of a refuge chamber is an 
explosion and/or fire. Fires are considered to be hazards commonly associated with the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. In the mining industry refuge chambers are considered to be an aid to possible 
survival, not a life assurance tool (USBM 1983). Failure or loss of the mitigative/control 
function provided by rekge chambers could result in an adverse mission 
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impact to the Project since they provide for underground fire protection Therefore, the ESF I 
ECRB Refuge Chambers are classified as FCL3. I 
5.2.2 Busted Butte Facilities System Classifications 
The Busted Butte systems identified in Section 2 are classified in the following subsections using 
the Functional Classification criteria identified in Section 5.1.1. The results of these 
classifications are summarized in Table 5-2 and in the subsections that follow. 
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Table 5-2. Functional Classification of Busted Butte Systems 
5.2.2.1 Busted Butte Subsurface Ventilation System 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Communication 
Ground Support Non-Q 
Subsurface Ventilation 
Power 
Surface Non-Potable Water 
Subsurface Fire and Non-Potable 
Water 
Data Acquisition 
Compressed Air 
Potable Water 
Muck Storage 
Surface Sanitation 
Subsurface Lighting 
Access Roads 
Busted Butte Pad Drainage 
Security System 
TopsoillRock Storage 
Parking Areas 
Operations Building 
VIA Not Applicable 
The Busted Butte Subsurface Ventilation System mitigates hazards commonly associated with 
the tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. The loss of the Ventilation System would not result in a life-threatening situation 
because there is a sufficient quantity of air to prevent asphyxiation, and the use of personal 
protective equipment mitigates the hazards associated with the accumulation of airborne 
hazardous materials. Furthermore, in the case of a loss of the Busted Butte Ventilation System, 
operations are halted and the tunnel will be evacuated of personnel. However, the Busted Butte 
Ventilation System is necessary to conduct tunnel operations and any loss of the system could 
negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted Butte Ventilation System is 
classified as FCL3. 
5.2.2.2 Busted Butte Power System 
Functional 
Classification 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL3 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
The hazards associated with the Busted Butte Power System are common to the 
tunnelinglrnining industry and are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The 
loss of the Busted Butte Power System could result in an impact to the Project mission because 
the system is linked to other systems and must inherit the highest FCL of those systems. 
SAFETY ENVELOPE 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
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Reviewing Table 5-2, the highest FCLs of systems fed by the Power System are FCL3. 
Therefore, the Busted Butte Power System is classified as FCL3. 
5.2.2.3 Busted Butte Compressed Air System 
The hazards associated with the Busted Butte Compressed Air System are common to the 
tunnelinglmining industry. The loss of the Compressed Air System would not result in a serious 
injury or death, or affect the mission at Busted Butte. The Busted Butte Compressed Air System 
is therefore classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.4 Busted Butte Communication System 
The function of the Busted Butte Communication System is to mitigate consequences of an 
accident or fire, which are common industrial hazards. Failure of this function could adversely 
impact the ability of the Project to complete the mission. Therefore, the Busted Butte 
Communication System is classified FCL3. 
5.2.2.5 Busted Butte Potable Water System 
The Busted Butte Potable Water System does not provide a safety function to the facility and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities; 
loss of the system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted Butte 
Potable Water System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.6 Busted Butte Non-Potable Water System 
Surface Non-Potable Water System-The Busted Butte Surface Non-Potable Water System 
mitigates hazards commonly associated with the tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not 
unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the Surface Non-Potable Water 
System could adversely impact the Project mission because it provides incipient fire protection 
for the surface facilities. Therefore, the Busted Butte Surface Non-Potable Water System is 
classified as FCL3. 
Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System- 
The Busted Butte Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable 
Water System mitigates hazards commonly associated with the tunnelinglmining industry; these 
hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization activities. The loss of the Busted Butte 
Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System could 
adversely impact the Project mission since it provides incipient fire protection underground. 
Therefore, the Busted Butte Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non- 
Potable Water System are classified as FCL3. 
5.2.2.7 Busted Butte Muck Storage System 
The Busted Butte Muck Storage System does not provide a safety function to the facility and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. 
Loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted 
Butte Muck Storage System is classified as FCL4. 
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5.2.2.8 Busted Butte Ground Support System 
The Busted Butte Ground Support System mitigates hazards commonly associated with the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. Although a complete failure of the system is highly unlikely, the loss of a portion of 
the ground support system (i.e., a keyblock) could negatively impact the Project mission. 
Therefore, Busted Butte Ground Support System is classified as FCL3. 
5.2.2.9 Busted Butte Sanitation System 
The Busted Butte Sanitation System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does 
not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. Loss of 
this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted Butte 
Sanitation System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.10 Busted Butte Subsurface Lighting System 
The hazards associated with the Busted Butte Subsurface Lighting System are common to the 
tunnelinglmining industry; these hazards are not unique to the YMP site characterization 
activities. The loss of the Busted Butte Subsurface Lighting System would not present a life- 
threatening situation or negatively impact the Project mission since the use of personal protective 
equipment (i.e., a cap lamp) mitigates the hazards. Therefore, the Busted Butte Subsurface 
Lighting System is classified as FCU. 
5.2.2.11 Busted Butte Access Road System 
The Busted Butte Access Road System does not provide a safety function to the facility and does 
not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. Loss of 
the Busted Butte Access Road System would not negatively impact the Project mission. 
Therefore, the Busted Butte Access Road System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.12 Busted Butte Pad Drainage System 
The Busted Butte Pad Drainage System does not provide a safety function to the facility and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. 
The loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted 
Butte Pad Drainage System is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.13 Busted Butte Security System 
The Busted Butte Security System provides protection from unauthorized access to the facility 
and does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization 
activities. The loss of this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, 
the Busted Butte Security System is classified as FCL4. 
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5.2.2.14 Busted Butte TopsoiYRock Storage 
Busted Butte TopsoiVRock Storage does not provide a safety function to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
this system would not negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, Busted Butte 
TopsoiVRock Storage is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.15 Busted Butte Data Acquisition System 
Busted Butte Data Acquisition does not provide a safety fimction to the facility and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. However, 
the loss of Data Acquisition could negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, Data Acquisition 
is classified as FCL3. 
5.2.2.16 Busted Butte Parking Areas 
The Busted Butte Parking Areas do not provide a safety function to the facility and do not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
the Busted Butte Parking Areas would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the 
Busted Butte Parlung Areas are classified as FCL4. 
5.2.2.17 Busted Butte Operations Building 
The Busted Butte Operations Building (two small trailers at Busted Butte) does not provide a 
safety function to the facility and does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP 
site characterization activities. A loss of the Busted Butte Operations Building would not 
negatively impact the Project mission. Therefore, the Busted Butte Operations Building is 
classified as FCU. 
5.2.3 North Las Vegas Test Facility Classification 
Tests are being performed in leased facilities that are maintained by the building owner. There 
are two buildings that comprise this facility: a laboratory facility in Building B-4 and a Low Bay 
facility in Building A-1. The North Las Vegas Test Facility systems identified in Section 2 are 
classified in the following subsections using the Functional Classification criteria identified in 
Section 5.1 .l .  The results of these classifications are summarized in Table 5-3 and in the 
subsections that follow. 
Table 5-3. Functional Classification of North Las Vegas Test Facility Systems 
I Functional I SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Classification I SAFETY ENVELOPE 
l ~ u i l d i n ~  8-4 FCL4 I NIA 
l ~ u i l d i n ~  A-I I FCL4 INIA 1 
NIA Not Applicable 
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5.2.3.1 Building B-4 
The tests being performed in Building B-4 are on material samples and are relatively small 
(counter top) size tests, typical of a civil/mechanical engineering laboratory. There is no large 
equipment or machinery. The testing activities are common to the industry and are consistent 
with the intended use of the facility. Failure of any of these tests will not cause the facility to 
shut down or impact the other tests being performed in Building B-4. No special monitoring of 
the facility is required by the tests that are performed in this building. Therefore Building B-4 is 
classified at a level of FCL4. 
5.2.3.2 Building A-1 
A test to measure the effectiveness of drift ventilation is being set up in this Low Bay building. 
The major components of this test are made up of steel, concrete, and crushed tuff. The Low 
Bay has overhead cranes that are used to set up the test, but are not used for the test. The 
maintenance and operations of these cranes is the responsibility of the building owner. This is 
the only test in this building and it is consistent with the intended use of the Low Bay building. 
Any failures associated with this test are not anticipated to shut down the building. There are no 
other tests in this building to impact. Therefore the Building A-1 Low Bay is classified at a level 
of FCL4. 
5.2.4 Other Area 25 Support Facilities 
The other Area 25 support facility systems identified in Section 2 are classified in the following 
subsections using the Functional Classification criteria identified in Section 5.1.1. The results of 
these classifications are summarized in Table 5-4 and in the subsections that follow. 
Table 5-4. Functional Classification of the Other Area 25 Support Facility Systems 
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SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Batch Plant 
Borrow Pit 
Lower Muck Storage Area 
Subdock 
Non-Hazardous Waste Management 
Area 
Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard 
Fran Ridge 
Boreholes 
Heliports 
Access Roads 
Meteorological Tower Complex 
Gas Station 
January 2002 
Functional 
Classification 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
FCL4 
SAFETY ENVELOPE 
NIA 
N/A 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
~ U N R  Seismic Studies I FCL4 INIA 
[control Support Area I FCL4 
I 
Table 5-4. Functional Classification of the Other Area 25 Support Facility Systems 
[Continuedl 
NIA Not Applicable 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Mine Rescue 
5.2.4.1 Batch Plant 
The Batch Plant does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the Batch Plant would 
not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Batch Plant is classified as FCL4. 
Functional 
Classification 
FCL4 
5.2.4.2 Borrow Pit 
SAFETY ENVELOPE 
NIA 
The Borrow Pit does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the Borrow Pit would 
not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Borrow Pit is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.3 Lower Muck Storage Area 
The Lower Muck Storage Area does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
the Lower Muck Storage Area would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the 
Lower Muck Storage Area is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.4 Subdock 
The Subdock does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the Subdock would 
not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Subdock is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.5 NWMA 
The NWMA does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the NWMA would 
not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the NWMA is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.6 Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard 
The Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does 
not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss 
of the use of the Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard would not negatively impact the Project 
mission. Thus, the Terrestrial Ecosystems Storage Yard is classified as FCL4. 
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5.2.4.7 Fran Ridge 
Fran Ridge is currently closed; therefore, it does not provide a safety fbnction at the YMP and 
does not mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. 
Thus, Fran Ridge is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.8 Boreholes 
The boreholes do not provide a safety fbnction at the YMP and do not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the use of the 
boreholes would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the boreholes are classified as 
FCL4. 
5.2.4.9 Heliports 
The Heliports do not provide a safety function at the YMP and do not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the use of the 
Heliports would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Heliports are classified as 
FCL4. 
5.2.4.10 Access Roads 
The Access Roads do not provide a safety function at the YMP and do not mitigate any unique 
hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the use of the Access 
Roads would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Access Roads are classified as 
FCL4. 
5.2.4.11 Meteorological Tower Complex 
The Meteorological Tower Complex does not provide a safety hnction at the YMP and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. 
Subsequent precipitation events (such as 1 inch of rain in 24 hours) at this site are reported 
through the Determination of Importance Evaluation process for surface-based testing activities. 
A loss of the use of the Meteorological Tower Complex would not negatively impact the Project 
mission. Thus, the Meteorological Tower Complex is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.12 Gas Station 
The Gas Station utilizes an industry standard system of storing and dispensing gasoline for 
vehicles that are utilized at Area 25. Gasoline is not directly used in the process of site 
characterization. A loss of the use of the Gas Station would not negatively impact the Project 
mission. Thus, the Gas Station is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.13 Mine Rescue 
The Mine Rescue Facility is used for maintenance and storage of YMP mine rescue equipment 
and training of mine rescue personnel. This facility is a backup for the Mine Rescue Facility in 
the North Portal Change House and a loss of use of this Mine Rescue Facility would not 
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negatively impact the ability to continue operations in the ESF and Busted Butte. Thus, the Mine 
Rescue Facility is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.14 UNR Seismic Studies 
The UNR Seismic Studies Facility does not provide a safety function at the YMP and does not 
mitigate any unique hazards associated with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of 
the use of the UNR Seismic Studies Facility would not negatively impact the Project mission. 
Thus, the UNR Seismic Studies Facility is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.4.15 Central Support Area 
The Sample Management Facility, the Hydrologic Research Facility, and the Site Maintenance 
Building, which comprise the Central Support Area, are all classified as FCL4. These facilities 
do not provide a safety function at the YMP and do not mitigate any unique hazards associated 
with the YMP site characterization activities. A loss of the use of these facilities that comprise 
the Central Support Area would not negatively impact the Project mission. Thus, the Central 
Support Area is classified as FCL4. 
5.2.5 Offices, Science Centers, and Warehouse Facilities 
The offices, science centers, and warehouse all occupy leased facilities that meet all applicable 
building codes and standards. These uses of leased facilities all are consistent with the intended 
purpose of each respective building. It is the conclusion of this Safety Basis Report that these 
type of leased buildings, used for these types of functions (office space, science center and 
warehouse), are exempt from functional classification in this Safety Basis. Changes to the 
internal configuration of these facilities will not impact the Project mission and will always be 
controlled by the owner of the buildings. 
5.3 OPERATING PARAMETERS 
There are no ESF, Busted Butte, North Las Vegas, or other Area 25 support facility systems I 
classified as FCLl or FCL2, so there are no operating parameters that need to be defined to 
establish the minimum safety envelope necessary for the critical operation of any systems. 
5.4 DEFINITIONS 
Common Industrial Hazards-Hazards routinely encountered by the general public or in 
general industry and construction, and for which national consensus codes andor standards exist 
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to guide safe design and operation without the need for special analysis to define safety design 
andlor operational parameters. 
Fatal Injury-In this instance, a Fatal Injury is defined as any injury that results in death within 
30 calendar days of the accident. 
Minor Injury-Any injury which: 
Requires hospitalization for less than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the 
date the injury was received 
Results in only a simple fracture of fingers, toes, or nose 
Does not cause severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage 
Does not involves any internal organ 
Does not involve second- or third-degree bums, or any bums affecting more than 
5 percent of the body surface. 
Serious Injury-Any injury which: 
Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from 
the date the injury was received 
Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose) 
Causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage 
Involves any internal organ 
Involves second- or third-degree bums, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the 
body surface. 
Public-For the purposes of Functional Classification, the public is considered to be individuals 
located at or beyond the site boundary. 
Worker-Persons located within the confines of the site boundary; this term includes facility 
workers, collocated workers, contractors, subcontractors, employees, and visitors. 
Visitors-Individuals who have not received General Underground Training and are not afforded 
unescorted access to the ESF. 
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG)-Airborne concentrations established by 
the American Industrial Hygienists Association for the use in emergency planning (AIHA 1998). 
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ERPG-1: the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild 
transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor. 
ERPG-2: the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for one hour without experiencing or developing 
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities 
to take protective action. 
ERPG-3: the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
life-threatening health effects. 
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6. SAFETY BASIS MANAGEMENT 
The management of changes to the Safety Basis for YMP site characterization activities, as 
established in this report, supports the continuous improvement function of the Integrated Safety 
Management process by providing a means of changing and updating the Safety Basis as the 
ESF matures. Configuration control of the Safety Basis is maintained via the Safety Basis 
management process. The Safety Basis management process is an integral part of the design 
process, the design control process, and hazard analysis. The objective of the Safety Basis 
management process is to evaluate and control changes that could potentially: 
Increase the risk from a hazard to the workers andlor the public beyond that previously 
analyzed, evaluated, and documented in the current document 
Reduce the reliability or effectiveness of features, controls, procedures, or processes that 
mitigate hazards 
Introduce a new hazard 
Reflect new information on existing hazards beyond that currently documented 
Personnel who have received training on the Safety Basis management process would perform 
an evaluation of changes to the Safety Basis against the above-cited criteria. 
When a proposal is made to modify or change any ESF system, the proposed design change 
requires an evaluation to determine if there exist any potential impacts to the Safety Basis. This 
evaluation must determine if a change is to be made to the Safety Basis or if the proposed design 
change should be altered such that the Safety Basis is not compromised. If the Safety Basis is to 
be changed, a formal process is provided through the Management of Safety Basis Change 
Process procedure (AP-ENG-001). 
The Management of Safety Basis Change Process procedure is integrated into the design control 
and work control processes in accordance with the Hazards Analysis System procedure (AP- 
ESH-008). The Hazards Analysis System procedure directs the use of the Management of Safety 
Basis Change Process procedure to ensure that design changes and work activities are evaluated 
for impacts to the Safety Basis. 
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APPENDIX A 
EVALUATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INVENTORIES 
Table A-I. Comparison of Radiological Potentially Releasable Quantities from Unsealed Sources to 
DOE-STE-1027-92 Category 3 Radionuclide Thresholds 
From liquid sources, unless otherwise noted 
~ r o m  the Sealed Source and Radioactive Material Inventory 
AS reported in DOE-STD-1027-92 
NIL Not Listed; no Category 3 Threshold listed in DOE-STD-1027-92 
NIA Not Applicable since no Category 3 Category is listed 
~ucl ide '  
Po-210 
Sr-90 
Ra-226 
Ra-226 
Am-241 +mixed 
gamma 
C-14lH-3 
C-14lH-3 
C-14 
H-3 
Pu-239 
Ra-226 
U-238,235,234 
Po-2 1 0 
U-235 
Am-241 
Ra-226 
C-14lH-3 
Ra-226 
Ra-226 
H-3 
C-14 
U-238,235,234 
Cs-137 (note: 
powder) 
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Current 
Activity 
(uci)' 
3.94E-08 
8.26E-02 
6.06E+00 
6.05E+00 
5.23E+00 
1.75E-01 
5.94E-02 
5.41 E-02 
6.70E-02 
2.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
4.00E-04 
2.72E-03 
2.00E-03 
1.97E-03 
2.49E-03 
5.49E-01 
8.10E-05 
1.50E-02 
6.37E-02 
6.12E-02 
1.28E+01 
6.57E-03 
Current 
Activity (Ci) 
3.94E-14 
8.26E-08 
6.06E-06 
6.05E-06 
5.23E-06 
1.75E-07 
5.94E-08 
5.41 E-08 
6.70E-08 
2.00E-09 
1.00E-09 
4.00E-10 
2.72E-09 
2.00E-09 
1.97E-09 
2.49E-09 
5.49E-07 
8.10E-11 
1.50E-08 
6.37E-08 
6.12E-08 
1.28E-05 
6.57E-09 
Sum 
Category 3 
Threshold 
(Ci) 
1.90E+00 
1.60E+01 
NIL 
NIL 
5.20E-01 
4.20E+02 
4.20E+02 
4.20E+02 
1.60E+04 
5.20E-01 
NIL 
4.20E+00 
1.90E+00 
4.20E+00 
5.20E-01 
NIL 
4.20E+02 
NIL 
NIL 
1.60E+04 
4.20E+02 
4.20E+02 
6.00E+01 
of Ratios = 
Ratio to 
Category 3 
Threshold 
2.07E-14 
5.16E-09 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .O1 E-05 
4.17E-10 
1.41 E-10 
1.29E-10 
4.19E-12 
3.85E-09 
NIA 
9.52E-11 
1.43E-09 
4.76E-10 
3.79E-09 
NIA 
1.31 E-09 
NIA 
NIA 
3.98E-12 
1.46E-10 
3.05E-08 
1.10E-10 
1 .O1 E-05 
Hazard Class 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
NIA 
NIA 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
NIA 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
NIA 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
NIA 
NIA 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Less Than Hazard Category 3 
Other Industrial 
Table A-2. Comparison of Radiological Potentially Releasable Quantities from Unsealed Sources to 
40 CFR 302.4 Appendix B Reportable Quantity Limits 
From liquid sources, unless otherwise noted. 
From the Sealed Source and Radioactive Material Inventory (CRWMS M&O 2000). 
AS reported in DOE-STD-1027-92. 
Am- 
R01145117 241 +mixed 1 6 1 gamma / 5.23E+00 1 5.231-06 1 1.00E-03 1 5.23E-09 1 0.01 / No I 
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131 -21 3 
110-1 10 
#3 
00019 
B 
00-001 
A 
1 of 7 
30f7 
6of 7 
NIA 
NIA 
January 2002 
Am-241 
Total Am- 
241 
C-14lH-3 
C-14lH-3 
C-14lH-3 
C-14 
C-14 
Total C-14 
H-3 
H-3 
Total H-3 
Pu-239 
U-238,235, 
234 
U-235 
U-238, 235, 
234 
Cs-137 
(NOTE: 
powder) 
1.97E-03 
5.23E+00 
1.75E-01 
5.94E-02 
5.49E-01 
5.41 E-02 
6.12E-02 
8.99E-01 
6.70E-02 
6.37E-02 
1.31 E-01 
2.00E-03 
4.00E-04 
2.00E-03 
1.28E+01 
6.57E-03 
1.97E-09 
5.23E-06 
1.75E-07 
5.94E-08 
5.49E-07 
5.41 E-08 
6.12E-08 
8.99E-07 
6.70E-08 
6.37E-08 
1.31 E-07 
2.00E-09 
4.00E-10 
2.00E-09 
1.28E-05 
6.57E-09 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.00E-03 
1.97E-12 
5.23E-09 
1.75E-10 
5.94E-11 
5.49E-10 
5.41 E-11 
6.12E-11 
8.99E-10 
6.70E-11 
6.37E-11 
1.31 E-10 
2.00E-12 
4.00E-13 
2.00E-12 
1.28E-08 
6.57E-12 
0.01 
0.01 
10.01100.0 
10.01100.0 
10.01100.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.01 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
1 .O 
N o 
NO 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
- 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
NO 
No 
N o 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to  Threshold Quantity and Threshold 
Planning Quantity Limits 
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Location 
Bldg 4015 
Bldg 4221 
Bldg 4320 
Busted Butte 
C Well 
Complex 
January 2002 
Chemical 
Nitric acid 
Aluminum 
oxide 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 
Acetone 
Diethylene- 
triamine 
Hydro- 
chloric acid 
Sodium 
fluoride 
Cobalt 
chloride 
hexahydrate 
Sodium 
sulfate 
Magnesium 
sulfate 
Sodium 
bicarbonate 
Potassium 
bicarbonate 
Calcium 
chloride 
Calcium 
nitrate 
Calcium 
hydroxide 
Acetonitrile 
Methanol 
Phosphoric 
acid 
Helium 
Sodium 
Hydroxide 
lnventoryl 
100 ml 
(0.33 lblA 
8 Ib 
4 gal 
3 gal 
(19.76 lblB 
5 gal 
7 gal 
(69.92 lblC 
15 9 
(3.31 E-02 Ib) 
2 kg 
(4.41 Ib) 
500 g 
(1.10 lb) 
OoO 
(2.20 Ib) 
1000 g 
(2.20 Ib) 
500 g 
(1 .I0 1b) 
1000 g 
(2.20 Ib) 
500 g 
(1.10 Ib) 
500 g 
(1 .I 0 Ib) 
4 1 
(6.92 lblD 
4 1 
500 ml 
(2.06 lblE 
4 cylinders 
3 kg 
(1.36 Ib) 
29CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
500 
(294.5%) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
40 CFR355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
1000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
40CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
15,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
NO 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
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Location 
Cabinet 
Outside Bldg 
4215 
Calibration 
Lab Bldg 
4215 
Drilling 
Subdock 
ESF 
ESF Pad1 
Busted Butte 
Pad 
January 2002 
Chemical 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 
Mercury 
Sodium 
chloride 
Acetylene 
Sulfur 
hexafluoride 
Lithium 
bromide 
Carbon 
monoxide 
Ethanol 
Aluminum 
oxide 
2,3,4,5 tetra 
fluoro- 
benzoic acid 
24,s 
trifluoro- 
benzoic acid 
2,6 difluoro- 
benzoic acid 
Cerium (Ill) 
chloride 
heptahydrate 
Lithium 
bromide 
Manganese 
chloride 
tetrahydrate 
Nickel (Ill) 
chloride 
hexahydrate 
Potassium 
iodide 
Pyridone 
Samarium 
Chloride 
Hexahydrate 
Sulfuric acid 
inventory' 
1 gal 
5 9  (0.01 Ib) 
1 kg 
250 ft3 
(17.01 lb)' 
2200 ft3 
159.44kg 
60 ft3 
8 oz 
4 Ib 
90 g 
75 g 
120 g 
75 g 
1.7 kg 
2 kg 
1 kg 
1.05 kg 
45 g 
75 g 
100 ml 
(0.39 lblG 
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
N L 
NL 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
N L 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
1000 
(454 kg) 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
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Location 
ESF Pad1 
Busted Butte 
Pad (cont'd) 
ESF South 
Portal 
ESF Under- 
ground 
ESF (QC 
Complex) 
ESF 
(Mechanics) 
ESF 
(Painters) 
ESF (Pipe 
Fitters) 
ESF (Tool 
Crib) 
-
ESF 
Warehouse 
FSC at 
Reclamation 
Storage 
Area 
HRF Bldg 
4125 
Hydrocheml 
Geophysical 
Labs Bldg 
4215 
January 2002 
Chemical 
Pentafluoro- 
benzoic acid 
Acetylene 
Acetylene 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
Acetylene 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 
Mur~at~c a id 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 
Propane 
Toluene 
Propane 
Muriatic acid 
Calcium 
Hypochlorite 
Butane 
7-amino-1-3- 
Naphthalene 
disulfonic 
acid 
Acetonitrile 
Barium 
chloride 
dihydrate 
Mercuric 
chloride 
Methanol 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
500 
NL 
lnventoryl 
100 g 
500 ft3 
(34.01 lblH 
250 fi3 
(17.01 lb)' 
3 Ib 
1500 ft3 
(102.04 lblJ 
16 oz 
4 gal 
1 gal 
99 oz 
(3.23 ~ b ) ~  
3 qt (5.42 lblL 
2048 oz 
(66.76 lblM 
11 gal 
100 1b 
30 oz 
(1.17 lblN 
1 kg 
2 1 
(3.46 lb)' 
1000 9 
100 g 
4 1 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
10,000 
10,000 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
NO 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 
Location 
Hydrocheml 
Geophysical 
Labs Bldg 
421 5 
(cont'd) 
January 2002 
Chemical 
Nitric acid 
Barium 
lnventoryl 
1 ml 
(3.31 E- 
031b)' 
I 
I I. 
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
500 
(294.5%) 
chloride, 1 anhydrous 
4-(2- 
pyridylazo) 
resorcinol 
4-methyl-2- 
pentanone 
Acetic acid, 
sodium salt 
trihydrate 
Ammonium 
hydroxide 
1 (30%) 
Hydroxyl 
amnine 
hydro- 
chloride 
Lanthanum 
chloride 
Lanthanum 
chloride, 7- 
hydrate 
Magnesium 
(1000 ppm) 
Oxalic acid, 
anhydrous 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
IONsoln. 
Sodium 
sulfite, 
anhydrous 
Strontium 
chloride, 6 
hydrate 
crystal 
Strontium 
1000 ppm 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
1000 
1 500 g 
5 g (0.01 Ib) 
1 I 
500 g 
4 1 
I (8.25 ~ b ) ~  
100 g 
250 g 
75 9 
500 ml 
50 g 
5 1 
(4.41 lblR 
500 g 
500 g 
500 ml 
125 g 
(0.28 Ib) 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
15,000 
I NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
I NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
I NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
I NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
I NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
I NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
I 
N o 
N o 
No 
I No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to  Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-7 January 2002 
Location 
Hydrocheml 
Geophysical 
Labs Bldg 
421 5 
(cont'd) 
prionic acid 
monohydro / /chloride 1 5 s  N L  I N L  N L  / N O  1 
Sulfuric acid 7 1 1000 
(85%) (27.34 lblS NL (454 kg) NL No 
2 1 
Acetonitrile (3.46 lblT NL NL NL N o 
8-Quinolinol 5 g NL NL NL No 
Hydrology 
Lab Bldg Aluminum 
4215 oxide 2.5 kg NL NL NL N o 
Methanol I I N L NL NL N o 
Aluminum 
Oxide 1 Ib NL NL NL N o 
Mercury 75 1b NL NL NNL N o 
Potassium 
Bicarbonate 500 g NL NL NL No 
4 1 
Acetone (6.96 lb)" NL NL NL N o 
Aluminum 
Nitrate 9- 
hydrate 10 1b N L NL NL No 
Calcium 
Selenate 
(99%) 438 g NL NL NL N o 
Calcium 
Sulfate 500 g N L NL NL No 
Helium I cylinder NL NL NL No 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 1 gal NL NL NL N o 
Potassium 
iodine 2 Ib N L NL NL N o 
Potassium 
nitrate 500 g NL NL NL No 
Potassium 
sulfate 500 g NL NL NL N o 
Sodium 
carbonate, 
anhydrous 1 Ib NL NL NL N o 
Sodium 
PY ro- 
phosphate 2.5 kg N L NL N L N o 
Chemical 
1 , I 0  
phenanthro- 
line, mono- 
hydrate 
2,3 diamino 
lnventoryl 
5 g  
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
N L 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
N L 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 
Location 
Hydrology 
Lab Bldg 
4215 
(cont'd) 
Mine 
Rescue 
Reclamation 
Storage 
Area 
Reclamation 
Storage 
Area Boxcar 
Site 1, NTS- 
60 (tower) 
Site 
Maintenance 
Bldg 4222 
Soils Lab 
Bldg 4222 
January 2002 
Chemical 
Cupric 
sulfate 
Lithium 
chloride 
Potassium 
chloride 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
(50%) 
Sodium 
chloride 
Magnesium 
sulfate 
Methane 
Nitrogen 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
lsopropyl 
alcohol 
Acetylene 
Hydro- 
chloric acid 
Propane 
Sulfur hexa- 
fluoride 
Carbon 
dioxide 
Argon 
Acetone 
Hydro- 
chloric acid 
1N soln. 
Hydro- 
chloric acid 
trace metals 
lnventoryl 
2.27 kg 
(5.00 Ib) 
1500 g 
1000 g 
1 pt 
(1.591b)" 
1500 g 
500 g 
4 ft3 
(0.18 ~ b ) ~  
510ft3 
1000 Ib 
64 oz 
I cylinder 
(250 ft3) 
(1 7.01 lb)' 
1.1 pt 
(1.37 lb)' 
5 tanks 
(5 5-lb 
tanks) 
10 tanks 
I tank 
I bottle 
27.36 1 
(47.601b)' 
1.5 1 
(0.12 lblAA 
10 1 
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
10,000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
15,000 
NL 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
Table A-3. Comparison of ESF Chemical Inventory to Threshold Quantity and Threshold Planning 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
NL - Not Listed; no TQ or TPQ was listed in the respective CFR 
Inventory obtained from the M&O Material Inventory Database 
Location 
Soils Lab 
Bldg 4222 
(cont'd) 
Tracer 
Trailer 
Waste 
Manage- 
ment Area 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 January 2002 
Chemical 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
(50%) 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
1 N soln. 
Argon 
Helium 
Carbon 
tetrachloride 
Aluminum 
chloride 
anhydrous 
Toluene 
Propane 
lnventory4 
500 ml 
(1.68 lb)" 
1 I 
(0.09 lblcc 
2 tanks 
I tank 
580 ml 
(2.04 lblDD 
44 g 
1 qt (1.81 ~ b ) ~ ~  
42.2 oz 
( 1 . 3 8 1 b ) ~ ~  
29 CFR 
1910.1 19 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
40 CFR 355 
Threshold 
Planning 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
N L 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
40 CFR 
68.125 
Threshold 
Quantity 
(Ib) 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
10,000 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
No 
No 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
Inventory determination notes: 
A. Nitric Acid density = 1.5040 kg11 at 25OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 3- 
68, p. 3-76) 
B. Acetone (2-Propanone) density = 0.7899 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (Weast 
1972, p. C-455) 
C. Hydrochloric Acid density = 1 .I980 kg11 at 20°C for 40 percent concentration (Perry 1973, 
Table 3-59, p. 3-75) 
D. Acetonitrile (acetic acid, nitrile) density = 0.7857 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration 
(Weast 1972, p. C-8 1) 
E. Phosphoric Acid density = 1.870 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, 
Table 3-70) 
F. Acetylene density = 14.7 ft3/lb at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (see assumption 3.3.1) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-10 January 2002 
G. Sulfuric Acid density = 1.7732 kg11 at 25OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 
3- 103) 
H. Acetylene density = 14.7 ft3/lb at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (see assumption 3.3.1) 
I. Acetylene density = 14.7 fi3/lb at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (see assumption 3.3.1) 
lb 250ft3 x - = 17.011b 
14.7ft3 
J. Acetylene density = 14.7 fi3/lb at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (see assumption 3.3.1) 
K. Propane density = 0.5005 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C-440) 
L. Toluene density = 0.8669 kg11 at 25OC for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C-512) 
gal 3.7851 0.8669kg lb  3gtx - X- x x = 5.42lb 
4qt gal 1 0.454kg 
M. Propane density = 0.5005 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C-440) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-l l January 2002 
N. Butane density = 0.6012 kg11 at O°C for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C-211) 
0 .  Acetonitrile (acetic acid, nitrile) density = 0.7857 kg11 at 20°C for 100 percent concentration 
(Weast 1972, p. C-8 1) 
P. Nitric Acid density = 1.5040 kg11 at 25OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 3- 
68, p. 3-76) 
1 
X 
1.504kg lml x - X lb = 3.31E - 031b 
lOOOml 1 0.454kg 
Q. Ammonium Hydroxide density = 0.9361 kg11 at 25OC for 30 percent concentration (Weast 
1972, p. D- 183) 
R. Sodium Hydroxide, 10 N solution (i.e., by definition of Normality, there are 10 g solute per 
liter of solution). The molecular weight of NaOH is 40 glmol. To find the quantity of NaOH 
in 5 1 of 10N solution: 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-12 January 2002 
S. Sulfuric Acid density = 1.7732 kg11 at 25 OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 
3-103) 
T. Acetonitrile (acetic acid, nitrile) density = 0.7857 kg11 at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration 
(Weast 1972, p. C-81) 
U. Acetone (2-Propanone) density = 0.7899 kg11 at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration (Weast 
1972, p. C-455) 
V. Sodium Hydroxide density = 1.5253 kg11 at 20 OC for 50 percent concentration (Perry 1973, 
Table 3-92, p. 3-78) 
qt gal 3.7851 1.5253kg lb lptx-x -x- x = 1.591b 
2pt 4qt gal I 0.454kg 
W. Methane density = .0448 lb/ft3 at 20 OC (Perry 1973, Table 3-31, p. 3-72) 
X Acetylene density = 14.7 ft3/lb at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration (see assumption 3.3.1) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-13 January 2002 
Y. Hydrochloric Acid density = 1.1980 kg11 at 20 OC for 40 percent concentration (Perry 1973, 
Table 3-59, p. 3-75) 
qt gal 3.7851 1.1980kg lb 1.lptx- x - X- x x = 1.3716 
2pt 4qt gal I 0.454kg 
Z. Acetone (2-Propanone) density = 0.7899 kg11 at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration (Weast 
1972, p. C-455) 
AA. Hydrochloric Acid, 1 N solution (i.e., by definition of Normality, there is 1-g solute per 
liter of solution). The molecular weight of HC1 is 36.47 g/mol. To find the quantity of HCl 
in 1.5 1 of 1N solution: 
Solving 
kg x Ib 54.71g x - = 0.1Ub 
1 OOOg 0.454kg 
BB. Sodium Hydroxide density = 1.5253 kg/l at 20 OC for 50 percent concentration (Perry 1973, 
Table 3-92, p. 3-78) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-14 January 2002 
CC. Sodium Hydroxide, 1 N solution (i.e., by definition of Normality, there is 1-g solute per 
liter of solution). The molecular weight of NaOH is 40.0 glmol. To find the quantity of 
NaOH in 1 1 of 1N solution: 
Solving 
kg x 40.0 g x - lb = 0.091b 
1 O O O g  0.454kg 
DD. Carbon Tetrachloride density = 1.595 kg11 at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 
1973, Table 3-2, p. 3-28) 
EE. Toluene density = 0.8669 kg11 at 25 OC for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C- 
512) 
gal 3.7851 0.8669kg lb lqtx- X- x x = 1.811b 
4qt gal 1 0.454kg 
FF. Propane density = 0.5005 kg11 at 20 OC for 100 percent concentration (Weast 1972, p. C- 
440) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-15 January 2002 
Table A-4. Comparison of North Las Vegas Test Facility Chemical lnventory to Threshold 
Quantity and Threshold Planning Quantity Limits 
Location Chemical l-
Sodium Test hexameta- 
B-4 phosphate 
Lithium 
bromide 
Potassium 
chloride 
Calcium 
iodide -t 
Potassium 
hydroxide 
Nitric acid 
Magnesium 
chloride *
I Potassium hvdroxide 
I Sodium phosphate 
Aluminum 
Ammonia 
Sulphate 
I Calcium Chloride 
Iron II 
chloride 
hydrate 
lnventory obtained from 
NL - Not Listed; no TQ or TF 
i e  M&O Material lnventory Database. 
I was listed in the respective CFR 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
Inventory determination notes: 
A. Nitric Acid density = 1.5040 kg11 at 25OC for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 3- 
68, p. 3-76) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 January 2002 
Table A-5. Comparison o f  ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to  40 CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 
Location 
Bldg 401 5 
Bldg 4221 
Bldg 4320 
Busted Butte 
C Well Complex 
January 2002 
Chemical 
Nitric acid 
Aluminum oxide 
lsopropyl alcohol 
Acetone 
Diethylene 
triamine 
Hydrochloric acid 
Sodium fluoride 
Cobalt chloride 
hexahydrate 
Sodium sulfate 
Magnesium 
sulfate 
Sodium 
bicarbonate 
Potassium 
bicarbonate 
Calcium chloride 
Calcium nitrate 
Calcium 
hydroxide 
Acetonitrile 
Methanol 
Phosphoric acid 
Helium 
Sodium 
Hydroxide 
lnventoryl 
l 0 0 m l  
(0.33 Ib) 
8 Ib 
4 gal 
3 gal 
(19.76 Ib) 
5 gal 
7 gal 
(69.92 Ib) 
15 9 
(3.31 E-02 
Ib) 
kg 
(4.41 Ib) 
500 g 
( I  . I 0  lb) 
1000 g 
(2.20Ib) 
1000 g 
(2.20Ib) 
500 g 
(1.101b) 
1000 g 
(2.20 Ib) 
500 g 
(1 . I 0  Ib) 
500 g 
(1.10 lb) 
4 1 
(6.921b) 
4 1 
500 ml 
(2.06 Ib) 
4 cylinders 
3 kg (1.36 1b) 
RP 
1 .OE-02 
NIA 
NIA 
0.5 
NIA 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
0.5 
NIA 
1 .OE-02 
NIA 
1 .OE-03 
Potentially 
Releasable 
Quantity (Ib) 
3.3E-03 
NIA 
NIA 
9.88 
NIA 
0.70 
3.31 E-05 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
3.46 
NIA 
0.02 
NIA 
1.4E-03 
40 CFR 302.4 
Reportable 
Quantity (Ib) 
1000 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
5000 
1000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
5000 
NL 
1000 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
Table A-5. Comparison of ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to  40 CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 1 Chemical 1 lnventoryl 1 Nl;p Location 
Cabinet Outside 
Blda 421 5 lsopropyl alcohol 1 gal 
Calibration Lab 5 9 
Bldg 421 5 Mercury (0.01 Ib) 1.OE-02 
Sodium chloride I kg NIA 
250 ft3 
Drilling Subdock Acetylene (17.01Ib) NIA 
Sulfur 
hexafluoride 2200 ft3 NIA 
ESF Lithium bromide 159.44 kg NIA 
Carbon 
monoxide 60 ft3 NIA 
Ethanol 8 oz NIA 
ESF Pad Busted 
Butte Pad 
Aluminum oxide 1 4 lb 
2,3,4,5 tetra 
fluorobenzoic 
acid 90 g NIA 
2,4,5 trifluoro- 
benzoic acid 75 g NIA 
2,6 difluoro- 
benzoic acid 120 g NIA 
Cerium (Ill) 
chloride 
heptahydrate 75 g NIA 
I Lithium bromide 1 1.7 kg I NIA 
Manganese 
chloride 1 kg 1 
tetrahydrate NIA 
Nickel (Ill) 
chloride 1 kg I 
hexahydrate NIA 
I Potassium iodide 1 1.05 kg 1 NlA 
1 Pyridone 1459 I NIA 
Samarium 
Chloride 
Hexahydrate 75 g 
l 0 0 m l  
Sulfuric acid 
benzoic acid 
ESF South Portal Acetylene I .  INIA 
Potentially 40 CFR 302.4 
Releasable Reportable Criteria ' 
Quantity(1b) 1 Quantity(1b) 1 Exceeded? 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA I NL I NO 
NIA I NL I No 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-18 January 2002 
Table A-5. Comparison of ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to  40 CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
Potentially 40 CFR 302.4 
Releasable Reportable Criteria 
Location Chemical lnventoryl RP Quantity (Ib) Quantity (Ib) Exceeded? 
ESF Under- 250 ft3 
ground Acetylene (17.01 Ib) NIA NIA N L N o 
ESF (QC Sodium 
Complex) hydroxide 3 Ib 1 .OE-03 3.OE-03 1000 N o 
1500 ft3 
ESF (Mechanics) Acetylene (102.06 Ib) NIA NIA NL N o 
Isopropyl alcohol 16 oz NIA NIA NL N o 
ESF (Painters) Muriatic acid 4 gal NIA NIA N L No 
lsopropyl alcohol 1 gal NIA NIA NL No 
99 02 
ESF (Pipe Fitters) Propane (3.23Ib) NIA NIA NL N o 
ESF (Tool Crib) Toluene (5.44 Ib) 0.5 2.72 1000 N o 3 qt 
Propane 2048 oz NIA NIA NL N o 
ESF Warehouse Muriatic acid 11 gal NIA NIA NL N o 
Calcium Hypo- 
chlorite 100 Ib 1.OE-03 0.10 10 N o 
FSC at 
Reclamation 30 oz 
Storage Area Butane (1.171b) NIA NIA NL No 
7-amino-1-3- 
Naphthalene 
HRF Bldg 41 25 disulfonic acid I kg NIA NIA NL No 
Hydrocheml 
Geophysical Labs 2 1 
Bldg 4215 Acetonitrile (3.46 Ib) 0.5 1.73 5000 N o 
Barium chloride 
dihydrate 1000 g NIA NIA NL N o 4 
- 
Mercuric chloride 100 g NIA NIA NL N o 
Methanol 4 1 NIA NIA NL N o 
1 ml  
(3.31 E-01 
Nitric acid Ib) 1 .OE-02 3.31 E-03 1000 N o 
Barium chloride, 
anhydrous 500 g NIA NIA NL N o 
4-(2-pyridylazo) 5 g 
resorcinol (0.01Ib) NIA NIA NL N o 
4-methyl-2- 
pentanone 1 I NIA NIA N L N o 
Acetic acid, 
sodium salt 
trihydrate 500 g NIA NIA NL N o 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 January 2002 
Table A-5. Comparison of ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to  4 0  CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
Hydrocheml 
Geophysical Labs Ammonium 
Bldg 421 5 (cont'd) hydroxide (30%) 
Hydroxyl amnine 
hydro-chloride 
Lanthanum 
chloride 
Lanthanum 
chloride, 7- 
hydrate 
I Magnesium (1 000 P P ~ )  
I Oxalic acid, anhydrous 
Sodium 
hydroxide ION 
soln. 
Sodium sulfite, 
anhydrous 
Strontium 
chloride, 6 
hvdrate crvstal 
Strontium 1000 I m m  
I Sodium hydroxide 
1,10 phenanthro- 
line, mono- 
hydrate 
2,3 diamino 
prionic acid 
monohydro 
chloride 
Sulfuric acid 1 (85%) 
1 Acetonitrile 
Hydrology Lab 
Bldg 4215 I Aluminum oxide 
I Methanol 
I Aluminum Oxide 
Potassium 
Bicarbonate 
Potentially 40 CFR 302.4 
Releasable Reportable Criteria 
Inventory1 RP Quantity (Ib) Quantity (Ib) Exceeded? 
500 ml NIA NIA NL N o 
5 1 
(4.41 Ib) 1 .OE-03 4.41E-03 1000 NO 
500 g NIA NIA NL N o 
500 ml 1 NlA ( NIA 
I NIA 1 NIA 
(27.34 Ib) 1 I .OE-02 / 0.27 1000 N o 
2 1 
(3.46 Ib) .5 1.73 5000 N o 
5 9 NIA NIA NL No 
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Table A-5. Comparison of ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to  40 CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 A-21 January 2002 
Location 
Hydrology Lab 
Bldg 421 5 (cont'd) 
Mine Rescue 
Reclamation 
Storage Area 
Reclamation 
Storage Area 
Boxcar 
Site 1, NTS-60 
(tower) 
Site Maintenance 
Bldg 4222 
Chemical 
Acetone 
Aluminum Nitrate 
9-hydrate 
Calcium 
Selenate (99%) 
Calcium Sulfate 
Helium 
lsopropyl alcohol 
Potassium iodine 
Potassium 
nitrate 
Potassium 
sulfate 
Sodium 
carbonate, 
anhydrous 
Sodium pyro- 
phosphate 
Cupricsulfate 
Lithium chloride 
Potassium 
chloride 
Sodium 
hydroxide (50%) 
Sodium chloride 
Magnesium 
sulfate 
Methane 
Nitrogen 
Sodium 
hydroxide 
Isopropyl alcohol 
Acetylene 
Hydrochloric acid 
lnventoryl 
4 1 
(6.96 Ib) 
10 1b 
438 g 
500 g 
I cylinder 
1 gal 
2 1b 
500 g 
500 g 
1 Ib 
2.5 kg 
2.27 kg 
(5.00 Ib) 
1500 g 
1000 g 
1 Pt (1.59 Ib) 
1500 g 
500 g 
4 ft3 
(0.18Ib) 
510 ft3 
1000 1b 
64 oz 
I cylinder 
(250 ft3) 
(17.01 Ib) 
1.1 pt 
(1.37 Ib) 
RF' 
.5 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .OE-03 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .OE-03 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
1.OE-03 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .OE-02 
Potentially 
Releasable 
Quantity (Ib) 
3.48 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
5.00 E-3 
NIA 
NIA 
1.59E-03 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .OO 
NIA 
NIA 
0.01 
40 CFR 302.4 
Reportable 
Quantity (Ib) 
5000 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
10 
NL 
NL 
1000 
NL 
N L 
NL 
NL 
1000 
NL 
NL 
5000 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
No ' 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
N o 
Table A-5. Comparison of ESF Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to 40 CFR 302.4 Reportable 
Quantity Limits (Continued) 
1 Inventory quantities calculated in Table A-3 are carried over to Table A-4. 
As reported in DOE-STD-1027-92 
NIA - Not Applicable, there is no Reportable Quantity 
NL - Not Listed in 40 CFR 302.4 
Location 
Site Maintenance 
Bldg 4222 (cont'd) 
Soils Lab Bldg 
4222 
7 
Tracer Trailer 
Waste 
Management Area 
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Chemical 
Propane 
Sulfur hexa- 
fluoride 
Carbon dioxide 
Argon 
Acetone 
Hydrochloric acid 
1 N soln. 
Hydrochloric acid 
trace metals 
Sodium 
hydroxide (50%) 
Sodium 
hydroxide I N  
soln. 
Argon 
Helium 
Carbon 
tetrachloride 
Aluminum 
chloride 
anhydrous 
Toluene 
Propane 
lnventoryl 
5 tanks 
(5 5-lb 
tanks; 35 Ib 
total) 
10 tanks 
I tank 
I bottle 
27.36 1 
(47.6 Ib) 
1.5 1 
(0.12 Ib) 
10 1 
500 ml 
(1.68 Ib) 
I I 
(0.09 Ib) 
2 tanks 
I tank 
580ml 
(2.04 Ib) 
44 g 
1 qt 
(1.81 Ib) 
42.2 oz 
(1.38Ib) 
RP 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
.5 
1 .OE-02 
NIA 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
NIA 
NIA 
1 .OE-02 
NIA 
0.5 
NIA 
Criteria 
Exceeded? 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
N o 
N o 
N o 
No 
No 
N o 
N o 
No 
Potentially 
Releasable 
Quantity (Ib) 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
NIA 
23.8 
1.2E-03 
NIA 
1.68E-03 
9.OE-05 
NIA 
NIA 
0.02 
NIA 
0.91 
NIA 
40 CFR 302.4 
Reportable 
Quantity (Ib) 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
5000 
5000 
NL 
1000 
1000 
NL 
NL 
5000 
NL 
1000 
NL 
Table A-6. Comparison of North Las Vegas Test Facility Chemical Potentially Releasable Quantities to 
40 CFR 302.4 Reportable Quantity Limits 
Potentially 
Releasable 
Quantity (Ib) Location 
40 CFR 302.4 
Reportable 
Quantity (Ib) 
1 Criteria 
Exceeded? Chemical 
Sodium 
hexameta- 
phosphate 
lnventow 
Atlas Test NIA INIA 
I Lithium bromide I 1 kg NIA INIA 
NIA I NIA I Sodium bromide 1 500 &I 
I Potassium chloride 1 500 NIA 1 NIA 
I Calcium iodide I 1 pt NIA I NIA 
I Nitric acid I ?,"z:b)~ 
Potassium 
hydroxide 
(solution) 
I Magnesium chloride 1 500 9 
I I 
(3.38 lblA 
NIA 1 NIA 
Potassium 
hydroxide (1.10 lb) 
Sodium 
phosphate (1.10 Ib) 
Aluminum 
ammonium 
sulfate NIA NIA 
- - 
Iron Il chloride 
hydrate 25 g 
' As reported in DOE-STD-1027-92 
NIA - Not Applicable, there is no Reportable Quantit) 
NL - Not Listed in 40 CFR 302.4 
NIA NIA 
Inventory determination notes: 
A. Potassium Hydroxide density = 1.5355 kg11 at 25 "C for 5 1.7 percent concentration (saturated 
solution) (Perry 1973, Table 3-78, p. 3-78) 
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B. Nitric Acid density = 1 SO40 kg11 at 25 "C for 100 percent concentration (Perry 1973, Table 
3-68, p. 3-76) 
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of Hazardous 
Material 
lnventory 
Radionuclide Inventory 
Meets or 
Attachment 1 Category 3 
Potentially Releasable 
Radionuclides RQ Meets 
A 
Potentiallv Releasable 
A 
Potentiallv Releasable 
~azardous Chemical rb< ~ a z a r d o m  Material 
RQ Meets or Exceeds Below 29 CFR 1910.119 
40 CFR 302. Table or 
40 CFR 302.4 Levels 
v I I 40 CFR 355 ~hresholds" v 
R~diologlsal Facility wl 
Noc-NuclearFacility 
Hazard Baseline Grouping 
'If chemicals are not listed in 29CFR1910.119 
Figure A-I. Determination of Hazard Baseline Grouping 
TDR-CRW-SE-000008 REV 00 ICN 02 January 2002 
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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